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ABSTRACT
OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES AND NEW
METHODS FOR BROADCAST ENCRYPTION AND
TRAITOR TRACING SCHEMES
Murat Ak
Ph.D. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
December, 2012
In the last few decades, the use of digital content increased dramatically. Many
forms of digital products in the form of CDs, DVDs, TV broadcasts, data over
the Internet, entered our life. Classical cryptography, where encryption is
done for only one recipient, was not able to handle this change, since its di-
rect use leads to intolerably expensive transmissions. Moreover, new concerns
regarding the commercial aspect arised. Since digital commercial contents are
sold to various customers, unauthorized copying by malicious actors became
a major concern and it needed to be prevented carefully. Therefore, a new
research area called digital rights management (DRM) has emerged. Within
the scope of DRM, new cryptographic primitives are proposed. In this thesis,
we consider three of these: broadcast encryption (BE), traitor tracing (TT),
and trace and revoke (T&R) schemes and propose methods to improve the per-
formances and capabilities of these primitives. Particularly, we first consider
profiling the recipient set in order to improve transmission size in the most
popular BE schemes. We then investigate and solve the optimal free rider
assignment problem for one of the most efficient BE schemes so far. Next, we
attempt to close the non-trivial gap between BE and T&R schemes by propos-
ing a generic method for adding traitor tracing capability to BE schemes and
thus obtaining a T&R scheme. Finally, we investigate an overlooked problem:
privacy of the recipient set in T&R schemes. Right now, most schemes do not
keep the recipient set anonymous, and everybody can see who received a par-
ticular content. As a generic solution to this problem, we propose a method
for obtaining anonymous T&R scheme by using anonymous BE schemes as a
primitive.
iv
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O¨ZET
YAYIN S¸I˙FRELEMEDE VE HAI˙N TAKI˙BI˙NDE
ENI˙YI˙LEMELER VE YENI˙ YO¨NTEMLER
Murat Ak
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Doktora
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
Aralık, 2012
O¨zellikle son yirmi yıl ic¸erisinde dijital ic¸erig˘in kullanımı oldukc¸a arttı.
CD’ler, DVD’ler, TV yayınları, I˙nternet gibi c¸ok sayıda dijital urun formları
hayatımıza girdi. S¸ifrelemenin tek bir kullanıcıdan tek bir kullanıcıya s¸eklinde
modellendig˘i klasik kriptografi bu deg˘is¸ime tam anlamıyla ayak uyduramadı,
c¸u¨nku¨ dog˘rudan klasik kriptografi kullanımı c¸oklu alıcı ku¨mesine go¨nderimlere
uygun deg˘ildi ve bu go¨nderilerin fazla bu¨yu¨mesine yol ac¸makta. Dahası, is¸in
ticari yanı da du¨s¸u¨nu¨ldu¨g˘u¨nde, yeni kaygılar ortaya c¸ıkıyor. Ticari dijital
ic¸erikler c¸ok sayıda mu¨s¸teriye satılabildig˘i ve kopyalanmaları kolay oldug˘u
ic¸in izinsiz kopyalanmalarını engellemek o¨nem arzediyor. Tam da bu ne-
denlerle dijital hak yo¨netimi adında yeni bir aras¸tırma alanı ortaya c¸ıktı.
Ve bu alanın c¸erc¸evesinde yeni kriptografik primitif yo¨ntemler o¨nerildi. Bu
tezde, bu yo¨ntemlerden u¨c¸u¨nu¨, yayın s¸ifreleme, hain tespiti, ve izleme ve
iptal yo¨ntemlerini, ele alıyoruz ve bu yo¨ntemlerin performanslarını ve ya-
pabildiklerini artırmaya yo¨nelik metotlar ortaya koyuyoruz. O¨ncelikle en
popu¨ler yayın s¸ifreleme yo¨ntemlerinde kullanıcıların profillerini hesaba katarak
go¨nderi maliyetinin du¨s¸u¨ru¨lmesini o¨neriyoruz. Daha sonra, halen en verimli
yayın s¸ifreleme yo¨ntemlerden bir tanesi ic¸in en iyi bedava alıcı yerles¸tirme
algoritması vererek maliyetin o¨nemli o¨lc¸u¨de du¨s¸u¨ru¨lebileceg˘ini go¨steriyoruz.
Bir sonraki c¸alıs¸mamızda yayın s¸ifreleme yo¨ntemlerine hain tespit mekaniz-
ması eklemenin jenerik bir yolunu vererek yayın s¸ifreleme ile izleme ve ip-
tal yo¨ntemleri arasındaki bos¸lug˘u ortadan kaldırıyoruz. Son olarak izleme ve
iptal yo¨ntemlerinde uzun zamandır go¨zardı edilmis¸ gizlilik problemini inceliy-
oruz. S¸as¸ırtıcı bic¸imde yayın s¸ifreleme yo¨ntemleri ic¸in dahi gizlilik c¸ok yakında
yayınlanan birkac¸ makale dıs¸ında go¨zardı edildi. Dolayısıyla halihazırdaki
vi
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yayın s¸ifreleme yo¨ntemleri, go¨nderinin yapıldıg˘ı kis¸ilerin kim oldug˘unu gi-
zlemiyor ve kimin hangi dijital ic¸erig˘e ulas¸abildig˘i yayınla birlikte ac¸ıktan
go¨nderiliyor. Bu konuda gizlilig˘i sag˘layan ilk anonim izleme ve iptal yo¨ntemini
de o¨neriyoruz.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Yayın s¸ifreleme, hain tespiti, dijital hak yo¨netimi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the advances in new technologies, the field of cryptography evolved even
faster in the last few decades. Before 70s, there was only symmetric key
encryption where we have one sender and one receiver, who have to somehow
know the exact same key before they can communicate securely. In the mid-
70s, public key cryptography (PKC) came into the scene and earned a well-
deserved reputation. Before PKC, it seemed unbelievable that two actors who
had not even met before can communicate secretly. And in 90s and the last
decade, many cryptographic primitives are introduced for situations where
PKC and old symmetric cryptography fell short. Digital rights management
(DRM) is an umbrella term for technologies that allow digital contents to be
secured over insecure channels and it is exactly one of the situations where PKC
is not enough and people did not have to wait long for schemes that fulfill its
requirements. Although it was more genius and elegant, PKC was still dealing
with one-to-one encryption by nature. That is, encryption was being made by
one sender to be decrypted by one receiver. In early 90s, broadcast encryption
is introduced in order to make efficient encrypted transmissions to groups of
users at once. Shortly after that, traitor tracing and trace and revoke methods
followed.
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1.1 Broadcast Encryption
Since it will be the main cryptographic method in the center of this thesis,
let us first explain broadcast encryption briefly. Broadcast encryption (BE)
is a cryptographic primitive that enables secure transmission of data to a
dynamically changing large set of users such that only an authorized subset
can decrypt it.
The usage of BE ranges from protecting recordable digital content in mul-
timedia applications such as pay-TV, secure audio/video streaming and In-
ternet multicasting, to file system security. Basically, whenever access control
needs to be imposed on a one-way communication channel, BE is good alter-
native to employ. This key role of BE makes it a useful tool in digital rights
management (DRM) technology. Especially in the last two decades new ap-
plication areas have emerged that greatly benefit from BE, such as content
protection [1, 2], multicasting promotional material and low cost pay-per-view
events [3], multi-certificate revocation/validation [4] and dynamic group key
management [5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
The users of a BE system are given a set of pre-installed, long-term keys,
typically in a set-top box. These keys are later used to encrypt the broad-
cast sessions such that only the set of authorized users, i.e., the users with
the appropriate long-term keys, can decrypt the broadcast. The users who
are authorized to receive a particular broadcast are called privileged (or sub-
scriber) whereas the remaining non-authorized users are called revoked (or
non-subscriber).
The particular design of a BE system varies according to the system char-
acteristics, such as the size of the user domain, required security level, available
bandwidth, and hardware capabilities. In the traditional setting, the amount
of long-term storage is very limited as it has to be tamper resistant, the com-
munication channel is one way, and the devices are stateless in the sense that
no additional long-term storage is possible.
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Note that for communication channels that are two-way, more effective
solutions than embedding long-term keys are possible. However, most of the
broadcasting communication channels are typically one way, such as satellite
channels, and the user decoders are modeled as stateless, meaning that they
have no typical long-term memory.
1.2 Related Work on Broadcast Encryption
The idea of BE is introduced by Berkovits [10] in 1991. However the model
of Fiat and Naor [11] is celebrated to be the first formal model of BE. They
introduced the resiliency concept for BE, and called a scheme k-resilient if it
is secure against any k revoked users working together, so that they would
not be able to decrypt the encrypted broadcast message. They also described
a scheme that required every receiver to store O(k log k log n) keys and the
center to broadcast O(k2 log2 k log n) messages where n is the total number of
users. Later on, fully resilient schemes dominated the BE research and these
schemes became obsolete.
In 1999, the logical key hierarchy (LKH) was proposed independently by
Wallner et al. [5] and Wong et al. [6]. According to LKH, the receivers were
being associated with the leaves of a tree, and a unique key is associated with
each node of the tree. Then, each receiver is given the keys of the nodes on the
path from the corresponding leaf to the root. Although being originally pro-
posed for secure Internet multicast, LKH was quite useful for BE. Recognizing
this fact, Abdalla et al. [3] used LKH to design a BE scheme and reduced key
storage complexity to logarithmic scale in terms of the number of receivers,
namely to O(log n) while achieving O(n) transmission overhead.
In their seminal paper, [12], Naor et al. proposed the renowned subset dif-
ference (SD) scheme. The SD scheme decreased the transmission overhead to
O(r) while keeping the key storage O(log2 n) by employing one-way functions.
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Later two important variants of SD was proposed. The layered subset differ-
ence (LSD) scheme, which was proposed by Halevy and Shamir [13]. Their
optimized LSD scheme has a transmission overhead of O(log n log log n) and a
key storage of O(r log log n). Goodrich, Sun and Tamassia [14] introduced the
stratified subset difference (SSD) scheme, which has O(r log n/ log log n) trans-
mission overhead and O(log n) key storage complexity. Horwitz presented an
analysis of [11, 13, 12] in his survey [15]. The SD scheme has recently gained
popularity in applications as well and is included in the next-generation DVD
standard [16].
Despite this popularity, the SD scheme did not long remain as the only
most efficient scheme. In 2005, Jho et al. [17] proposed the Punctured Interval
(PI) scheme. The PI scheme is also a subset cover framework scheme but
with a different subset structure. The subsets are designed as intervals with
possible skippings on a straight line on which users are thought to be placed
virtually. Originally, in [18, 19, 17, 20], the PI scheme is employed alongside
two other subset cover schemes called C-basic chain and cascade chain and
they are treated as one combined scheme. Basic chain subsets are defined
as all intervals with a length less than a bound. On top of the basic chain
and PI subsets, these schemes also employ the cascading idea to bring extra
transmission cost efficiency by grouping subsets from different layers together.
This combined scheme outperforms the SD scheme in terms of transmission
overhead but with a slightly larger key storage requirement.
On the other hand, a number of different approaches to the BE problem
have been introduced in the public key setting. Typically, these schemes rather
depend on number theoretic structures and there are no predefined subsets.
They allow keys to be generated on-the-fly for any privileged user subset. In
2005, Boneh et al. [21] used bilinear maps and the bilinear decision Diffie-
Hellman exponent problem to design a public key BE system. Their scheme
has constant size private key and offers a trade-off between ciphertext and
public key sizes, product of which can be linear in the number of receivers.
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The BE problem is also investigated in the context of identity-based en-
cryption where, briefly stated, public keys are the identities of user. Boneh and
Hamburg provided a framework for ID-based BE schemes in [22]. As a result
of the increasing interest around 2008, several identity based and public-key
BE schemes have been proposed [23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
1.3 Performance of BE schemes and Improve-
ment Methods
In different settings, some concerns such as user domain size, security, band-
width, or hardware may be more important than others. However, usually,
two concerns are inherent in almost all BE systems. First, the amount of key
storage must be adequate because the long-term secure storage size at the
receiver side is very limited since it has to be tamper resistant. Second, the
amount of additional data sent along with the content through the communi-
cation channel, called the transmission overhead, must be adequate because
of the limited nature of the bandwidth of communication channels.
1.3.1 Free riders
In all traditional BE schemes, by default, it is assumed that all unauthorized
receivers must be revoked in an encrypted broadcast. However, Abdalla et
al. [3] pointed out that this assumption could be relaxed for some applications,
and the transmission overhead can be reduced significantly by allowing a lim-
ited amount of free riders. So, in certain cases, a number of non-subscribers
can be allowed to decrypt the broadcast in order to reduce the overall cost
of the system. Such users are called free riders. In this case, there needs to
be a limit on the number of free riders allowed, and the question is how to
optimally use this given free rider quota.
5
1.3.2 Profiles
User profiling is the concept of monitoring data on preferences and interests
of the users in the system in order to serve them more effectively. It is broadly
used in various areas such as web mining [28] and broadcasting and multicas-
ting [29, 30, 31].
In the BE literature, traditionally, the users are assumed to be identical
in the sense that they are taken to be equally likely to be interested in any
particular broadcast. However, in practice every user has a certain type of
interest, some being more interested in sport events, some in movies, some
in entertainment, etc. If these user profiles are taken into account, they can
provide some critical information to optimize the operations of a BE system.
1.4 Traitor Tracing and Trace & Revoke Sys-
tems
As we mentioned above, broadcast encryption (BE) schemes handle the task of
encrypting content for groups of users. However, this might not be enough for
certain DRM systems. Because when a malicious user forges a decoder that
circumvents the access control used by the content distribution system, BE
schemes can do nothing about this. Such a decoder created by an adversary
is called a pirate decoder, the users that divulge their keys to the adversary
are called traitors, and the divulged keys are called traitor keys. The sender
may want to restrict this type of behavior since such adversarial behavior
introduces additional unauthorized receivers in the system. Traitor tracing
is such a deterrence mechanism where an authority is capable of performing
an analysis to any working pirate decoder and recovering at least one of the
traitor keys that was used in its construction. Traitor tracing emerged first
in the work of Chor, Fiat and Naor [32] as a solution to the problem that we
mentioned above.
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We categorize the traitor tracing mechanisms as non-black-box if it is pos-
sible to extract the keys from the decoder through reverse-engineering tech-
niques. Such schemes that have been proposed in the literature include [33, 34].
However, in many settings, the non-black-box approach is inapplicable for
many reasons, e.g., it may be expensive or deterred through obfuscation or
the tracer may only have remote access to the decoder. We call black-box
tracing if the tracing authority interacts with the pirate decoder in a black-
box manner: querying the decoder with input and observing the response of
the decoder. Majority of the works, [35, 36, 37, 32, 38, 39, 40, 41], in the
traitor tracing literature supports black-box tracing.
Trace and Revoke Schemes: The ultimate goal in a content distribution
system would be combining traitor tracing and broadcast encryption so that
any receiver key found to be compromised in a tracing process would be re-
voked in the future transmissions. This is introduced by Naor and Pinkas in
[42]. However, it is not possible to achieve this trivially, and a naive combi-
nation of both mechanisms would severely fail as discussed in the subsequent
works [43, 44, 12]. The subset cover framework of [12] leads to a number of
schemes [14, 13] which rely on combinatorial structures and support some-
what weak tracing in the symmetric setting (the tracing does not guarantee to
identify a traitor but rather disables the pirate decoder). This weakness leads
to a new type of attack called Pirate Evolution in [45]. The studies on trace
and revoke schemes followed in the public key setting with notable examples
of by Boneh et al. [43] and by Furukawa and Attrapadung [46]. We leave the
discussion of traitor tracing and trace and revoke systems to Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we will briefly present the preliminary knowledge needed and
the definitions that we will adhere to throughout the thesis.
2.1 Broadcast Encryption Model
In order to represents users in a BE system, we will consider n recipients
that we will denote with the set U . We suppose a broadcasting center that
continually makes broadcasts to subsets of U . This subset possibly changes
every time a new broadcast is made.
2.1.1 Structure of a Broadcast Encryption Scheme
Since we will explain these algorithms formally when needed in the following
chapters, we briefly explain the general structure here. A broadcast encryption
scheme can be defined in terms of three algorithms.
• A key distribution algorithm for creating keys and assigning them to
receivers in the construction time of the BE system.
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• An encryption algorithm that encrypts the message such that only in-
tended user can decrypt.
• A decryption algorithm that will be run by receivers and succeed only if
the receiver is in the intended set. Otherwise it must give no non-trivial
information about the message.
2.1.2 Security Definitions
Security of a BE scheme is about the confidentiality of the data being sent.
As in classical cryptography, it is defined in the form of an indistinguishability
game. In the relevant chapters we will give this game in detail. Basically, a
revoked user must be unable to distinguish the message being sent from an
arbitrary message from the message space. That is, if a revoked user listens to a
broadcast channel and obtains an encrypted message c, and if it is provided two
messagesm1 andm2 one being the message in c (c = BroadcastEncrypt(mb))
the probability of guessing b correctly must be close to 1/2. By “close” we
mean that it must be different than 1/2 by only a negligible amount in terms
of the system parameters. We leave detailed explanation of security to the
relevant chapters.
2.1.3 Evaluation Parameters
As in all computational systems, the speed of the key distribution, encryption
and decryption algorithms are important parameters by default. The speed of
the key distribution algorithm is the least sensitive one, however, because it will
typically be run only once when the system is being prepared beforehand. The
speed of the decryption algorithm is typically more important since the device
that will run the decryption algorithm will be less powerful. For example, a
broadcasting center’s device is usually much more powerful than a set-top box
in a house.
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However, there are two evaluation parameters more specific to broadcast
encryption schemes: key storage and transmission overhead. Key storage is
basically the size of the key per receiver. This storage must be minimized
since the keys must be tamper-resistant in order to prevent illegal actions by
malicious actors like stealing the keys and forging pirate decoders. Transmis-
sion overhead is the extra cost of broadcast encryption compared to insecure
broadcasts.
Key storage and transmission overhead has a trade-off. As more keys are
stored, it is more likely that a broadcast encryption can be made with less
transmission overhead. There are theoretical works that show this trade-off
such as [47]. However, it is easy to see this trade-off intuitively: If we can store
a unique key for every possible subset, we can use only one encryption for each
broadcast because for every subset, we already have a key. On the other hand,
if we were allowed to store only one key per user, we have to encrypt the content
as many times the number of users in the intended recipient set. Both cases
are infeasible in almost all broadcast encryption systems since the number
of users is typically huge and we simply have neither that much key storage
space in the user devices to carry out the first idea nor that much bandwidth
capacity to carry out the second.
2.2 Traitor Tracing
Although BE schemes fulfill the encryption and decryption functionalities for
DRM systems, there are still a few problems. One important problem is that a
malicious party who obtains a number of user keys can forge a pirate decoder.
Broadcasting centers need to be able to investigate these decoders and identify
the keys that are used to forge it. Traitor tracing schemes are designed for
this purpose.
Traitor tracing methods are defined on top of a broadcast encryption sys-
tem in the form of a tracing algorithm. Tracing algorithm gets the pirate
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decoder and its known properties such as its success ratios when transmissions
are made to particular subsets. Usually, pirate decoders are modeled as a black
box. That is, we assume that we cannot reverse engineer a pirate box and eas-
ily get the keys inside it. So, we are only allowed to make transmissions and
observe the successes and failures of the pirate decoder. This is called black
box tracing.
2.2.1 Tracing capability
The success of a tracing algorithm is measured by its tracing capability. This
capability has two parameters:
• Number of users allowed to collude to make the pirate decoder
• The probability of the tracing algorithm to successfully identify at least
one traitor key.
Trace and Revoke System: A trace and revoke (T&R) system can be
thought as a BE scheme together with a tracing method. This is, in a sense,
the ultimate goal in a DRM system and it is the best type of system we can
achieve today.
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Chapter 3
Broadcast Encryption with
Client Profiles
In this chapter, we study the problem of achieving a more efficient BE system
in the presence of provided user preference information. Our approach works
by constructing the subset structure of a CS or SD system according to the
given set of subscriber profiles. We first analyze the relationship between
the transmission overhead of a BE scheme and the distribution of the user
profiles. After proving several key results, we give two optimal algorithms for
the CS scheme with one broadcast type. Then we generalize our approach
by proposing a similarity metric for the CS and SD schemes with multiple
broadcast types. Theoretical and experimental results show that the approach
can significantly reduce the transmission overhead of the CS-based and SD-
based BE schemes. This reduction can especially be remarkable when the
proposed approach is used in conjunction with an optimal free rider assignment
[48, 49].
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3.1 User Profiles
User profiling has been used in a number of different applications. Recent
works in broadcasting literature have made use of user profiles in order to
increase broadcast efficiency in several aspects [50, 31, 30]. Similarly, web-user
profiles have been heavily studied to serve individual users more effectively [28,
51]. User profiling was also used in multicast key management [52] where the
key distribution tree is optimized according to the members’ expected stay
time in a session.
In a recent study that utilizes subscriber profiles for BE efficiency, D’Arco
and De Santis [53] proposed a method for efficient key storage, the other impor-
tant performance metric for a BE system besides the transmission overhead, in
presence of non-uniform revocation probabilities. The authors assumed these
probabilities to be given and used this information to give fewer keys to users
with a higher probability of revocation.
The idea of allowing free riders in a broadcast to get better performance was
introduced by Abdalla, Shavitt and Wool [3]. They investigated the usage of
free riders and developed the basic intuitions about their effective assignment.
Ramzan and Woodruff [49] recently proposed an algorithm to optimally choose
the set of free riders in a CS scheme to minimize the transmission overhead.
Ak, Kaya, and Selcuk [48] extended this work to the SD scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, user profiles have not been used in the BE
literature to reduce the transmission overhead despite the fact that the subset
cover framework is by its nature an excellent context for utilizing user profiles.
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3.2 Subset Cover Framework and the CS and
SD Schemes
A subset-cover BE scheme first generates a collection of subsets from the user
set and associates a different long-term key with each subset. Then, every user
in the system is installed with the long-term keys of the subsets he is included
in.
To broadcast a message to a privileged user set P , the sender finds a cover
C from the subset collection such that
P = ∪S∈CS
and encrypts the message using the keys of the subsets in C. The number of
subsets in C, i.e., |C|, is called the transmission cost which is one of the main
performance parameters for a BE scheme.
Both the CS and SD schemes obtain the user subsets by organizing the
users in a binary tree. These schemes differ in the way they define their
subsets.
In the CS scheme, the leaves of the subtree rooted at a node x ∈ T corre-
spond to a subset in the system. That is, for every node x, a subset is defined
as
Sx = {v|v is a leaf of T (x)}
where T (x) denotes the subtree rooted at node x. An example subset and an
example cover are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
In the SD scheme, a subset is defined by two nodes x and y where y is a
descendant of x in T . A subset Sx,y is the set of leaves that are descendants
of x but not descendants of y. More formally, for every non-leaf node x, and
every descendant y of x, a subset is defined as
Sx,y = {v|v is a leaf node, v ∈ T (x) and v /∈ T (y)}.
14
(a) A single CS subset (b) A CS cover
Figure 3.1: A simple subset and cover of the CS scheme. Revoked users are
denoted by white leaves.
The total user set is also included as a subset in the SD scheme. An example
subset and an example cover for the SD scheme are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
(a) An SD subset (b) An SD cover
Figure 3.2: A simple subset and cover of the SD scheme. Revoked users are
shown with white leaves.
Note that every subset in the CS scheme is also a subset in the SD scheme.
The SD scheme also has the advantage of covering the leaves of several subtrees
at once by a single subset. The increased key storage complexity of the SD
scheme is reduced by an intelligent key generation scheme employing a pseudo-
random function [12].
3.3 Broadcast Encryption with User Profiles
As noted in Section 1, the original CS and SD schemes treat the users iden-
tically when organizing the key distribution tree. However, if we have infor-
mation about the user preferences and interests, we can use this information
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to group similar users together and make the BE scheme more efficient by
constructing the subsets in a more clever way.
Consider a system supporting b different types of broadcasts where type
j has a broadcast probability of qj and
∑b
j=1 qj = 1. Let pu,j denote the
probability of user u subscribing to a broadcast of type j. We denote the
profile of user u with the b-tuple (pu,1, pu,2, . . . , pu,b).
As described above, both CS and SD schemes use a binary tree T to orga-
nize the subsets and construct the cover. For a binary tree T , we will use rT
to denote its root and LT to denote the set of its leaves. For a node x ∈ T ,
par(x), sib(x), l(x) and r(x) denote the parent, sibling, left child and right
child of x in T , respectively. For a node x, let px,j denote the probability of
all users (leaves) in T (x) subscribing to a type j broadcast, i.e.,
px,j =
∏
u∈LT (x)
pu,j
where LT (x) is the set of leaves in the subtree with root x.
For clarity, we will investigate the cases b = 1 and b ≥ 1 separately and
we will use the terms unitype and multitype broadcast to refer to these cases,
respectively.
3.3.1 Analysis of the CS Scheme with User Profiles
We will first investigate the unitype broadcast case. In this case, we will use
pu instead of pu,1 to denote the probability of user u being a subscriber. Let
P (Sx) be the probability of a CS subset Sx being used in a cover.
Lemma 3.3.1 In a CS tree, if x is a node other than the root, then
P (Sx) = px − pxpsib(x) = px − ppar(x).
If x is the root rT , then P (Sx) = prT =
∏
u∈LT
pu.
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Proof For a node x other than the root, if Sx is in the cover, all the users in
LT (x) must be subscribers. Also, there must be at least one non-subscriber in
LT (sib(x)), because otherwise Spar(x) would be in the cover instead of Sx.
Note that if x is the root, Sx will be in the cover if and only if each user in
LT is a subscriber, which happens with probability
∏
u∈LT
pu.
Let ECS(T ) denote the expected cover size for a CS tree T .
Theorem 3.3.2 For a CS tree T ,
ECS(T ) =
∑
x∈LT
px −
∑
x/∈LT
px. (3.1)
Proof The expected cover size for the CS scheme is equal to the sum of P (Sx)
over all x ∈ T . Hence,
ECS(T ) =
∑
x∈T
P (Sx) =
∑
x∈T, x 6=rT
(
px − ppar(x)
)
+ prT . (3.2)
Note that since T is a binary tree, for each non-leaf x, px appears three times
in the summation where one of them is positive and the other two are negative.
And for a leaf x, the contribution to the summation is one px. Hence, (3.2) is
equal to (3.1).
Theorem 3.3.2 can be extended to the multitype case where b ≥ 1:
Theorem 3.3.3 For a CS scheme with b ≥ 1 broadcast types, the expected
cover size is
ECS(T ) =
b∑
j=1
qj

∑
x∈LT
px,j −
∑
x/∈LT
px,j

 (3.3)
Proof The expected cover size is the weighted average of the expected cover
sizes for all broadcast types. Since each type j has probability qj, ECS(T ) is
equal to (3.3).
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3.3.2 Analysis of the SD Scheme with User Profiles
As in Section 3.3.1, we begin with an analysis for the unitype SD scheme: Let
P (Sx,y) be the probability of an SD subset Sx,y being used in a cover, and let
P (S∗,y) =
∑
x is an ancestor of y
P (Sx,y).
Lemma 3.3.4 For a non-leaf, non-root node y ∈ T ,
P (S∗,y) = psib(y)(1− pl(y))(1− pr(y)), (3.4)
and for a leaf y ∈ LT
P (S∗,y) = psib(y)(1− py). (3.5)
Proof If Sx,y is used in the cover, for a node y and one of its ancestors x,
all the users in LT (sib(y)) must be subscribers. Furthermore, if y is a non-leaf,
non-root node, there must be at least one non-subscriber in both LT (l(y)) and
LT (r(y)).
If y is a leaf node and Sx,y is in the cover sib(y) must be a subscriber and
y cannot. Hence (3.4) and (3.5) follow.
Let ESD(T ) denote the expected cover size for an SD tree.
Theorem 3.3.5 In an SD tree T ,
ESD(T ) =
∏
y∈LT
py +
∑
y∈LT
(
psib(y)(1− py)
)
+
∑
y/∈LT
y 6=rT
(
psib(y)(1− pl(y))(1− pr(y))
)
. (3.6)
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Proof The expected cover size for the SD scheme, ESD(T ), is equal to the
sum of P (S∗,y) for all y ∈ T except the root rT . Besides, if all of the users
subscribe to a broadcast, which happens with probability
∏
y∈LT
py, the cover
size will be one. Hence,
ESD(T ) =
∑
y∈T−{rT }
P (S∗,y) +
∏
y∈LT
py.
By substituting (3.4) and (3.5) for P (S∗,y), (3.6) follows.
Theorem 3.3.5 can be extended to the multitype case:
Theorem 3.3.6 For an SD scheme with b ≥ 1 broadcast types, the expected
cover size is
ESD(T ) =
b∑
j=1
qjESD(T, j) (3.7)
where
ESD(T, j) =
∏
y∈LT
py,j +
∑
y∈LT
(
psib(y),j(1− py,j)
)
+
∑
y/∈LT
y 6=rT
(
psib(y),j(1− pl(y),j)(1− pr(y),j)
)
is the expected cover size for the broadcast type j with probability qj.
Proof The expected cover size is the weighted average of the expected cover
sizes for all broadcast types. Since each type j has probability qj, ESD(T ) is
equal to (3.7).
3.4 Optimal CS Tree Construction
In this section, we will give two optimal tree construction algorithms for the
unitype CS scheme. We will assume that for users u1, u2, · · · , un, the subscrip-
tion probabilities are pu1 ≥ pu2 ≥ · · · ≥ pun ; i.e., the users are indexed with
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respect to their subscription probabilities in decreasing order. We say that a
CS tree is optimal if it minimizes the expected cover size.
We will consider the optimal CS tree organization problem for two different
settings: First, the CS tree has to be a balanced tree, and second, the CS tree is
not necessarily balanced. We will refer the former as the balanced setting and
the latter as the general setting. Lemma 3.4.1 below applies to both settings:
Lemma 3.4.1 In a CS scheme with unitype broadcast, there exists an optimal
tree where u1 and u2, the two users with the highest subscription probabilities,
are siblings.
Proof First recall that for any binary tree T , balanced or unbalanced,
ECS(T ) =
∑
x∈LT
px −
∑
x/∈LT
px. Let T be an optimal tree with the mini-
mum expected cover size. If u1 and u2 are siblings in T then we are done.
Otherwise let v1 and v2 be the siblings of u1 and u2, respectively. Since we
are investigating both settings, balanced and general, v1 and v2 may be in-
ternal nodes of T . Let r be the first common ancestor of u1 and u2 and let
path(r, u1) = (r, d1, d2, . . . , dm1 , u1) and path(r, u2) = (r, f1, f2, . . . , fm2 , u2) be
the paths from r to u1 and u2, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.3(a).
(a) Before swap (b) Swap u1 and v2 (c) Swap u2 and v1
Figure 3.3: Structure of T (r) before and after the swap operations.
Note that pu1pv1 is a factor of each term in {pd1 , pd2 , . . . , pdm1}, and pu2pv2
is a factor of each term in {pf1 , pf2 , . . . , pfm2}. Let D =
∑m1
i=1 pdi/(pu1pv1)
and F =
∑m2
i=1 pfi/(pu2pv2). Let V (u1, u2) be the combined set of nodes on
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path(d1, dm1) and path(f1, fm2). The expected cover size can be written as
ECS(T ) =
∑
x∈LT
px −
∑
x/∈LT∪V (u1,u2)
px −
∑
x∈V (u1,u2)
px
=
∑
x∈LT
px −
∑
x/∈LT∪V (u1,u2)
px − (pu1pv1D + pu2pv2F )
where the first two terms do not change if we swap u1 and v2, or u2 and v1, as
shown in Figures 3.3(b) and 3.3(c), respectively. We have two cases:
1. D < F : Let T ′ be the tree obtained by swapping u1 and v2 as in Fig-
ure 3.3(b). Since we have pu1 ≥ pv2 and pu2 ≥ pv1 , the difference
ECS(T )− ECS(T ′) = pv1pv2D + pu1pu2F − pu1pv1D − pu2pv2F
= pu2F (pu1 − pv2)− pv1D(pu1 − pv2)
is non-negative. Given that T is optimal, we must have that pu1 = pv2
and swapping u1 and v2 does not change the expected cost.
2. D > F : Let T ′ be the tree obtained by swapping v1 and u2 as in the
Figure 3.3(c). Since we have pu2 ≥ pv1 and pu1 ≥ pv2 , the difference
ECS(T )− ECS(T ′) = pu1pu2D + pv1pv2F − pu1pv1D − pu2pv2F
= pu1D(pu2 − pv1)− pv2F (pu2 − pv1)
is non-negative. Given that T is optimal, we must have that pu2 = pv1
and swapping u2 and v1 does not change the expected cost.
3. D = F : Let T ′ be the tree obtained by swapping u1 and v2 as in Fig-
ure 3.3(b). (Note that we could choose to swap u2 and v1, as well.) Since
we have pu1 ≥ pv2 and pu2 ≥ pv1 , the difference
ECS(T )− ECS(T ′) = pv1pv2D + pu1pu2F − pu1pv1D − pu2pv2F
= pu2F (pu1 − pv2)− pv1D(pu1 − pv2)
is non-negative. Given that T is optimal, we must have that pu2(pu1 −
pv2)− pv1(pu1 − pv2) = 0 which implies (pu2 − pv1)(pu1 − pv2) = 0. (Here,
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note that if we had chosen to swap u2 and v1 we would end up with this
same equation, by symmetry.) Then, either pu2 = pv1 or pu1 = pv2 . If
pu2 = pv1 , swapping u2 and v1 does not change the expected cost. If
pu1 = pv2 , in this case, swapping u1 and v2 does not change the expected
cost. So in either case, we can come up with an optimal tree where u1
and u2 are siblings.
Hence, for all three cases we can say that the two nodes with maximum
subscription probabilities can be paired in a tree that preserves the optimality.
3.4.1 Optimality for Balanced Trees
In this section we give the optimal CS tree construction algorithm with the
balanced tree constraint. We assume that n is a power of 2 throughout the
discussion in this section.
Lemma 3.4.2 For a unitype CS scheme, there exists an optimal balanced CS
tree where the pairs (u1, u2), (u3, u4), · · · , (un−1, un) are siblings of each other.
Proof From Lemma 3.4.1, we know that there exists an optimal balanced tree
T such that (u1, u2) are siblings. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4.1, starting
with T , the other users can be paired as siblings by swapping operations by
an iterative process that starts with (u3, u4). Note that u3 and u4 are the
users with the two maximum subscription probabilities excluding u1 and u2;
hence the optimality is preserved after the swap operations. Since the tree T
is balanced at the beginning, each leaf T will have a leaf sibling at any time.
Now we are ready to prove the main result for the balanced case.
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Theorem 3.4.3 In a unitype CS scheme with the balanced tree constraint,
sorting the users in the leaf level with respect to their subscription probabilities
gives the minimum expected cover size.
Proof Let T (k) denote an optimal balanced CS tree of depth k whose leaf
nodes are grouped as stated in Lemma 3.4.2 as (u1, u2), (u3, u4), . . . , (un−1, un)
for a given user set. Let H(k) denote the balanced tree of depth k on the same
user set, obtained by ordering the leaves according to the sorted pui values. We
will use induction on the depth of the tree to prove that ECS(T
(k)) = ECS(H
(k))
for any k.
For the basic case, for any set of two nodes, obviously ECS(T
(1)) =
ECS(H
(1)). Now assume that the claim is also true for all balanced trees
with depth less than k. For the tree T (k) for a given user set, let T ′ denote
the subtree of depth k − 1 which has the paired nodes u2i−1,2i as its leaves,
with probabilities pu2i−1,2i = pu2i−1pu2i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2. Let H(k−1) denote the
balanced tree obtained by sorting the same set of nodes, {u1,2, . . . , un−1,n}. By
induction, ECS(T
′) ≥ ECS(H(k−1)). Also from (3.1),
ECS(T
(k)) = ECS(T
′) +
n∑
i=1
pui − 2
n/2∑
i=1
pu(2i−1)(2i)
ECS(H
(k)) = ECS(H
(k−1)) +
n∑
i=1
pui − 2
n/2∑
i=1
pu(2i−1)(2i) .
Hence, ECS(T
(k)) ≥ ECS(H(k)); and since T (k) is optimal, H(k) is also optimal.
3.4.2 Optimality for the General Setting
The optimal construction for the general setting is also based on equation (3.1)
and Lemma 3.4.1, which are true independent of the tree’s being balanced.
Let Ti be a tree with one user node ui. Let T ◦ T ′ denote the union of two
trees constructed by adding a new root r and connecting T and T ′ to r as the
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left and right subtrees. The Uni-Gen Cluster algorithm below takes the
subscription probabilities as inputs and constructs a broadcast tree with the
minimum expected cover size in a style similar to Huffman trees [54].
Algorithm 1 Uni-Gen Cluster
1: T ← {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}, , where Ti is the tree containing just one node ui
2: while |T | is not equal to 1 do
3: Find the pair T, T ′ ∈ T with maximum prT and prT ′
4: Construct the merged tree T ′′ = T ◦ T ′
5: T ← T \ {T, T ′}
6: T ← T ∪ T ′′
7: return T
The algorithm works in a bottom-up fashion. At each iteration, two trees T
and T ′ with the largest prT and prT ′ are selected. These trees are extracted from
the queue, and a new tree T ′′ = T ◦ T ′ with a new root rT ′′ is inserted where
prT ′′ = prT prT ′ . The optimality proof of the tree obtained by this algorithm is
given in Theorem 3.4.4:
Theorem 3.4.4 For a unitype CS scheme, the tree obtained by the Uni-Gen
Cluster algorithm is optimal with the minimum expected cover size.
Proof Let T (k) denote an optimal CS tree with k leaves where u1 and u2 are
connected as siblings as stated in Lemma 3.4.1, for a given user set. Let H(k)
denote the tree with the same k leaves constructed by the algorithm Uni-Gen
Cluster. We will use induction on the number of leaves in the tree to prove
that ECS(T
(k)) = ECS(H
(k)) for any k.
For the basic case, for any set of two nodes, obviously ECS(T
(2)) =
ECS(H
(2)). Now assume that the claim is also true for all trees with k − 1 or
fewer leaves. For the tree T (k) for a given user set, let T ′ denote the tree with
k−1 leaves obtained by merging u1 and u2 into a new node u12, with probability
pu12 = pu1pu2 . Let H
(k−1) be the tree constructed by the Uni-Gen Cluster
24
algorithm from the same set of leaves. By induction, ECS(T
′) ≥ ECS(H(k−1)).
Also from (3.1),
ECS(T
(k)) = ECS(T
′) + pu1 + pu2 − 2pu12
ECS(H
(k)) = ECS(H
(k−1)) + pu1 + pu2 − 2pu12 ,
and it follows that ECS(T
(k)) ≥ ECS(H(k)). We know T (k) is optimal, therefore
H(k) is optimal.
3.5 The Case of Multitype Broadcasts
In multitype BE schemes, we cannot simply group the users with respect to
their subscription probabilities since there are b different subscription proba-
bilities for each user. Nevertheless, if we place similar users closer in the tree,
the number of subtrees containing them will increase, hence smaller covers can
be obtained. We will first focus on the probability of two users being interested
in a common broadcast. If two users’ probabilities of being interested in the
same broadcast are both high, we will say that these two users are similar. We
define the similarity of two user profiles as the weighted sum of the products
of their probabilities over different broadcast types:
Sim(u, v) =
b∑
j=1
qjpu,jpv,j.
Assuming that the user subscription decisions are independent, the similarity
between two users is the probability of both subscribing to a common broad-
cast.
Extending the formulation for individual users to groups of users, we define
the similarity of groups of users as follows: We call a set of users similar if the
probability of all users being interested in the same broadcast is high. Let T
and T ′ be two trees containing disjoint sets of users as their leaves. Then the
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similarity of these trees are
Sim(T, T ′) =
b∑
j=1
qjprT ,jprT ′ ,j
where
prT ,j =
∏
u∈LT
pu,j.
3.5.1 The Balanced Tree Algorithm
The Multi-Bal Cluster algorithm below clusters the set of users according
to the Sim metric and organizes them as the leaves of a balanced binary
tree. It works by arranging the tree in levels. It starts with the bottom
level by organizing the most similar users in pairs. Then, at every level, pairs
of nodes/subsets are matched and clustered according to their similarities.
Algorithm 2 Multi-Bal Cluster
1: T ← {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}, where Ti is the tree containing just one node ui
2: S ← {}
3: while |T | is not equal to 1 do
4: while T is not empty do
5: Find the pair T, T ′ ∈ T with maximum Sim(T, T ′)
6: Construct the merged tree T ′′ = T ◦ T ′
7: T ← T \ {T, T ′}
8: S ← S ∪ {T ′′}
9: T ← S
10: S ← {}
11: return T
The algorithm works in a bottom-up fashion; in the first iteration, it clus-
ters the pairs of leaves starting with the most similar pair. The pairs in these
clusters will be the siblings in the resulting tree. In the next iteration, these
clusters are paired and this process continues until just one cluster remains
and the tree is constructed. Note that the algorithm constructs a balanced
binary tree since the list T always contains trees of the same depth. For
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b = 1, the Multi-Bal Cluster algorithm sorts the users with respect to
their subscription probabilities, which we know to give the optimal CS tree for
b = 1.
3.5.2 The General Algorithm
The similarity approach can also be used for the general setting where the CS
and SD trees need not be balanced.
Algorithm 3 Multi-Gen Cluster
1: T ← {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}, where Ti is the tree containing just one node ui
2: while |T | is not equal to 1 do
3: Find the pair T, T ′ ∈ T with maximum Sim(T, T ′)
4: Construct the merged tree T ′′ = T ◦ T ′
5: T ← T \ {T, T ′}
6: T ← T ∪ {T ′′}
7: return T
As in the balanced setting, theMulti-Gen Cluster algorithm constructs
the tree in a bottom-up fashion. Similar to its unitype counterpart Uni-Gen
Cluster, at each iteration the algorithm chooses and merges the most similar
pair.
3.6 Experimental Results
We tested the performance of the proposed algorithms against the standard
BE approach by running a large number of experiments on synthetically gen-
erated user profiles. The user profiles were carefully generated with various
characteristics to be representatives of a wide variety of applications.
We experimented with a population of n = 1024 users. Each user profile
contains b subscription probabilities for some 1 ≤ b ≤ 10. For each broadcast
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type j, the subscription probabilities pi,j are randomly generated by using a
bimodal density function based on two uniform distributions with respective
means of µ1 = 0.9 and µ2 = 0.1 to represent the interested and uninterested
user populations, respectively. The overall population mean, µ, is determined
according to the weight of the interested users in the population. For each set of
experiments, we compared the average transmission costs of the basic CS and
SD schemes with those obtained by subscriber profiling. In the experiments,
the broadcast types are taken to be equally likely with a probability of qj = 1/b
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ b.
The experimental results are summarized in Figure 3.4 where the transmis-
sion costs of the basic and similarity-based CS and SD schemes are compared.
The results show that utilizing the user profiles with the given similarity met-
ric can reduce the transmission cost significantly. For the balanced-tree CS
scheme, the reduction rate is about 20–45% for larger values of b and more than
20–50% for smaller values of b. The improvements are even more significant
for the balanced-tree SD scheme, with 25–55% improvement for larger values
of b and 25–65% for smaller b values. The cost reduction rates get higher with
larger population means.
The improvement rates for the generalized (unbalanced) algorithm are only
slightly better than those of the balanced tree algorithm for smaller values of b
and the population mean; however as the value of b gets larger and the popu-
lation mean increases, the generalized algorithm provides better improvement
rates that allow up to an additional 5% reduction in the transmission costs.
3.7 Using Similarity Approach with Free Rid-
ers
Free riders are the users who are able to decrypt a broadcast session although
they are not subscribed to it. Some free riders can be allowed in a BE system
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Figure 3.4: Transmission costs of the CS and SD schemes in their basic form
and with subscriber profiling. Four different plots are given for four different
values of the interested user density, 5%, 10%, 30% and 50%, making the
population mean 0.14, 0.18, 0.34 and 0.5, respectively. The results indicate
that significant reductions are possible over the basic CS and SD schemes by
the proposed algorithms. On the other hand, there is only a slight difference
between the balanced-tree algorithms and their generalized counterparts.
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in order to lower the transmission cost by relaxing the restriction that the
cover must exactly match the privileged user set. Free riders must be assigned
carefully in order to reduce the cost effectively. Optimal free rider assignment
algorithms for the CS and SD schemes have recently been given by Ramzan
and Woodruff [49] and Ak et al. [48], respectively.
Our proposed similarity-based organization algorithms can be expected to
be even more effective when a few free riders can be tolerated. Our approach
aims to obtain large subsets by taking a set of consecutive users as subscribers.
Hence, if a few remaining non-subscribers can be tolerated as free riders in such
a sequence of subscribers, a larger and fully privileged subset can be obtained,
leading to more compact covers.
Let f denote the number of free riders that can be allowed, and let cf denote
the free rider ratio, f/(n−r), where n and r are the total number of users and
the number of revoked users, respectively. We tested the performance of our
algorithms with a given number of free riders by a large number of simulation
experiments with n = 1024 and 0.1 ≤ cf ≤ 1.0, where the user profiles are
generated with the same parameters used for the experiments with no free
riders in Section 3.6.
Figures 3.5,3.6,3.7 and 3.8 show the results for the basic and the similarity-
based CS and SD schemes with free riders for b = 1, 2, 5, 10 broadcast types.
The plots demonstrate the improvements in the transmission cost according
to the free rider ratio cf . The results show that significant savings can be
achieved by using the similarity approach and allowing a very limited number
of free riders. A sharp decrease in the transmission cost can be obtained by
using the similarity approach with a free rider ratio of just 10%, while the
improvement rates of the basic CS and SD schemes appear to be linear with
cf .
The experiments show that allowing a free rider ratio of 10% reduces the
transmission cost of the similarity-based CS scheme by 40 − 70% and the
similarity-based SD scheme by 35− 55%, whereas the transmission cost of the
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Figure 3.5: Transmission costs of the CS and SD schemes with free riders, in
their basic form and with user profiling, where the number of broadcast types
is b = 1. The results indicate that a sharp decrease in the transmission cost
is possible by allowing a limited number of free riders, especially for higher
values of µ.
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Figure 3.6: Transmission costs where b = 2.
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Figure 3.7: Transmission costs where b = 5.
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Figure 3.8: Transmission costs where b = 10.
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original schemes are only reduced by 20%. As a result, the similarity-based CS
scheme has 65−85% lower cost than the original CS scheme and the similarity-
based SD scheme has 60− 80% lower cost than the original SD scheme when
a free rider ratio of 10% is allowed. The similarity approach becomes more
effective at smaller values of b and at greater values of µ, which is consistent
with the previous experiments with no free riders.
The balanced-tree and the generalized algorithms have similar transmission
costs for a given number of free riders, while the generalized algorithms have
a slight cost advantage over their balanced-tree counterparts.
3.8 Discussion
In this chapter, we analyzed the problem of reducing the transmission costs of
subset-cover based BE schemes of CS and SD by utilizing information about
user interests. We gave optimal algorithms for the CS scheme when only one
type of broadcast exists. For the multitype case, we proposed a similarity
approach which can be used in both CS and SD schemes. The simulation
experiments showed that the proposed algorithms are effective and can provide
significant reductions in the transmission complexity of a BE system. The
gains obtained by the proposed algorithms turn out to be even more significant
when a limited number of free riders can be tolerated in the system.
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Chapter 4
Free Rider Optimization for
Punctured Interval Broadcast
Encryption Scheme
In this chapter, we study how to reduce the transmission cost of the Punctured
Interval (PI) scheme [17] by effective use of free riders. In certain scenarios
where allowing a limited number of non-privileged users (called free riders) to
decrpyt the transmission, the center can shrink the size of the transmission
significantly by making such a relaxation.
The idea of allowing free riders, which may be considered as a relaxation
for the original BE problem, was introduced and investigated by Abdalla et
al. [3]. Ramzan and Woodruff [49] proposed an algorithm to optimally choose
the set of free riders to be allowed in the CS scheme [12]. Recently, Ak et al.
[55] solved the same problem for the SD scheme [12].
In the following sections, we first give an algorithm for finding the the
optimal placement of free riders for an instance specified by:
• a user set,
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• the set of subscribers which is a subset of the user set,
• ratio of the number of free riders allowed to the number of revoked users.
We then propose a parametric heuristic that we call the top-down algorithm
for the same problem which runs much faster than the optimal algorithm
while decently reducing the transmission overhead. We also provide a hybrid
solution which, in a sense, uses ideas from both the optimal algorithm and the
top-down heuristic in order to obtain a trade-off between speed and reduction
in transmission overhead.
4.1 Punctured Interval (PI) scheme
In this chapter, we will focus on the punctured interval (PI) scheme (a.k.a.
skipping-chain scheme) of [20, 19, 17, 18]. We confine ourselves to the plain
form of this scheme without combining it with the C-basic chain and cascade
chain schemes. We assume that the PI scheme itself is used in a layered
fashion, which we will describe in detail in Section 4.1.1.
The PI scheme is a subset cover scheme, and subsets are designed in the
form of bounded-size punctured intervals on a virtual number line which can
possibly have at most a certain number of skippings called punctures. So, it is
parametrized with two parameters c and p which represent the bounds on the
size of the punctured intervals and on the number of punctures, respectively.
Specifically, subsets are designed as follows: First, users are thought on a line
numbered from 1 to n. For every (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n and j − i < c, for
every π = {x1, x2, . . . , xp} with i < xk < j and xk < xk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p},
Si,j;π is the set of users {ui, . . . , uj}\{ux1 , ux2 , . . . , uxp}. For example, S3,9;{5,8}
consists of users 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 as shown in Figure 4.1.
The PI scheme works like any other scheme in the subset cover framework.
For every subset, i.e., punctured interval, a key is made available to the users
Figure 4.1: Sample subset S3,9;{5,8}.
Figure 4.2: Sample cover with c = 4 and p = 2 for basic PI scheme. Red
(dark) cells indicate revoked users.
in that subset and when a broadcast is to be made, it is encrypted with a
set of keys, subsets of which covers the privileged user set. One may note
that if we were to store one key per each subset in the form Si,j;π, we would
need to store too many keys in the receiver boxes. Particularly, O(cp+2) keys
would be needed per user. However, using one-way functions, the number of
keys to store is reduced to O(cp+1) in [17]. Note that this reduction becomes
quite significant especially for large c and small p. Since key storage is not
a concern in our work, we refer the readers who are interested in key storage
cost to [17, 20, 19, 18].
When a broadcast is to be made, having all the subsets defined as above
and keys distributed accordingly, what remains is to find the best cover for
the privileged set, consisting of the predefined subsets. It is easy to see that
the best cover can be found by going from the beginning to the end (1 to n)
and including the next longest punctured interval successively [17]. A simple
cover with such subsets is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.1.1 Layered PI scheme
In the basic PI scheme, when most of the users are privileged, there would
be many consecutive full subsets in the cover. Therefore, [17] further adds
layers to their scheme so that long intervals of users can be included to the
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Figure 4.3: Sample cover with c = 4 and p = 2 for layered PI scheme. Dark
cells indicate revoked users. Note how the number of subsets reduced when
layers are introduced.
cover by fewer subsets. In the original form of the scheme [20, 19, 17, 18]
layers consist of non-punctured long intervals for covering long sequences of
consecutive privileged users. Here, we consider a generalized form of this
approach for layering: We allow punctured intervals in the upper layers as
well. More precisely, the idea is to group c consecutive users together and
treat them as one user in the layer above. At the end, there will be ⌊logc n⌋+1
layers each having c times more users than the one above itself. The subsets
in the upper layers are defined in the same way as the basic PI scheme but
their keys are prepared independently.
Note that the key storage does not increase significantly: Since each layer
will have 1/c times fewer users, the number of keys required by each layer
decreases exponentially. Therefore, the total number of keys required increases
only logarithmically. Throughout this work, we focus on this modified version
of the layered PI scheme.
In the layered scheme, sets are also parametrized by their layers, and de-
noted by Sℓ;i,j;π meaning the subset at layer ℓ, from node i to node j having
punctures π between i and j.
In the layered PI scheme, privileged users are covered in a greedy manner
39
starting from the highest layer, covering as many fully privileged nodes as
possible, and proceeding with the next layer. An example cover is shown in
Figure 4.3.
Jho et al. [17] further employ cascading on top of the layered PI scheme to
improve the scheme further. However, the performance improvement it brings
becomes visible only if the ratio of revoked users is less than 0.1% as already
shown emprically in [17]. Since we concentrate on relatively larger revoked
user ratios, we confine ourselves to the layered PI scheme as we defined.
4.2 Problem Statement
One of the critical evaluation parameters regarding BE schemes is the trans-
mission overhead. This cost is measured as the number of encryptions per
a single broadcast. BE schemes in the subset cover framework perform one
encryption per subset in the cover. Therefore, the transmission overhead is
simply the number of subsets in the cover. Since the PI scheme is such a
BE scheme and subsets are designed as punctured intervals, the transmission
overhead that we focus on is the number of punctured intervals in a cover.
Note that by allowing a certain number of free riders and relaxing the
constraint that privileged sets must be covered exactly, one may reduce the
transmission overhead of the broadcast. The question is, given a fractional
limit on the number of free riders, how should one use this free rider quota
best in order to decrease the transmission overhead as much as possible?
Notation: We denote the set of all users with U , while denoting its two
partitions, the privileged and revoked user sets in a particular broadcast, by P
and R, respectively, where n = |U |, ρ = |P |, r = |R|. Throughout the chapter,
we will assume that users are organized in a B-tree-like data structure, T , to
represent users as in Figure 4.3. In particular, T is in the form of a double
array of nodes. We denote the ℓth layer by T [ℓ] and its ith node by T [ℓ][i].
Each node has the following information:
• number of users beneath the user i at layer ℓ, denoted by #usr(T [ℓ][i]),
• number of privileged users beneath it, denoted by #pri(T [ℓ][i]),
• number of revoked users beneath it, denoted by #rev(T [ℓ][i]),
• index of the left and right children in the previous layer, denoted by
T [ℓ][i].left and T [ℓ][i].right, respectively.
Nodes in the first layer of T (that is, T [0]) correspond to individual users.
Nodes in the upper layers correspond to intervals of users arranged as explained
in Section 4.1.1. We also denote the index of the top layer by ℓmax. Note that
ℓmax = ⌊logc n⌋+1. Thus, T [ℓmax] includes a single node, T [ℓmax][0], covering
all users.
The allowed free riders to revoked users ratio is denoted by cf and the
number of free riders allowed becomes
fr = cf · r
The set of all subsets, denoted by S, is defined according to the Layered
PI scheme as explained in Section 4.1.1. Intervals on the layered structure is
defined via three parameters, and denoted by Iℓ;i,j , where ℓ denotes the layer
number whereas i and j are the start and end nodes.
Problem: Having stated all the needed notation, the problem is to find a
cover C ⊆ S with the smallest cardinality |C| where
P ⊆
⋃
Sℓ;x,y;π∈C
Sℓ;x,y;π
with ∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
Sℓ;x,y;π∈C
Sℓ;x,y;π \ P
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ fr = cf · r
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Throughout the chapter, we will assume that instances of the problem are
already organized into a data structure, T , that represents the users, layer
nodes, child-parent relationships and revoked and privileged counts of the
nodes.
4.3 Optimal Algorithm
In this section, we describe a dynamic programming solution for the problem
stated in Section 4.2.
We define a subproblem (Iℓ;i,j, f) as follows: What is the minimum cost
to cover an interval Iℓ;i,j with f free riders? For a particular subproblem in-
stance, we record the solutions to subproblems in a four-dimensional table
cost where each cell corresponds to the solution of a subproblem. In particu-
lar, cost[ℓ, i, j, f ] denotes the minimal cost of covering the users beneath the
interval Iℓ;i,j by using exactly f free riders. The table is filled for all ℓ ranging
from 0 to ℓmax, i and j with i ≤ j ranging from 0 to |T [ℓ]|, and f ranging from
0 to fr.
4.3.1 The Algorithm
In this section, we will present OptimalPICoverc,p algorithm that, for a
given T instance and ratio of free riders, finds the minimum transmission cost
possible by the free rider relaxation idea.
In the OptimalPICoverc,p algorithm, only iterations through the sub-
problems are performed. Filling a single cell of the table cost is delegated to
the FindCost procedure. Iterations are done in such an order that the costs
for all subproblems are solved before the ones that use them. Algorithm goes
from the lowest layer to the highest one and at each layer, subproblems are
solved from right to left. The rationale behind this order in which the table
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is filled will become more clear when we describe the recurrence relation in
Section 4.3.2.
Algorithm 4 OptimalPICoverc,p(T ,cf )
1: if cf ≥ 1 then
2: return 1
3: fr ← ⌊cf · r⌋
4: for ℓ from 0 to ℓmax do
5: for j from |T [ℓ]| down to 0 do
6: for i from j down to 0 do
7: for f from 0 to fr do
8: cost[ℓ, i, j, f ]← FindCost(ℓ, i, j, f)
9: return cost[ℓmax, 0, 0, fr]
The cost of a particular interval with a given number of free riders is
calculated by the FindCost procedure (Algorithm 5). This procedure first
checks the base cases:
• If the number of free riders allowed is more than the number of revoked
users in the interval, it returns ∞ as the cost, because we do not want
to allocate more than enough free riders.
• If there are no privileged users in the interval, it returns 0, because we
obviously do not need to cover this interval.
• If the interval is a one-node interval:
– If the number of free riders allowed is just enough for the revoked
users under that node, it returns 1 meaning that the node is covered
by itself as an interval.
– If we do not have enough free riders, then it takes the cost from the
layer below, which must be set already because of the direction of
execution.
After handling all these basic cases, the procedure finally makes its core cal-
culation in the final line, which we will explain separately. The FindCost
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procedure is given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 FindCost(ℓ, i, j, f)
1: if #rev(Iℓ;i,j) < f then
2: return ∞
3: if #pri(Iℓ;i,j) = 0 and f = 0 then
4: return 0
5: if i = j then
6: if f = #rev(T [ℓ][i]) then
7: return 1
8: if f < #rev(T [ℓ][i]) then
9: if ℓ > 0 then
10: chl ← T [ℓ][i].left
11: chr ← T [ℓ][i].right
12: return cost[ℓ− 1, chl, chr, fr]
13: return CompMinCost(ℓ, i, j, fr)
4.3.2 CompMinCost procedure
The last line of the FindCost procedure consists of a single call to the Comp-
MinCost procedure. The aim of this minimization operation is to find the
minimum cost to cover Iℓ;i,j with f free riders, by using the costs of other sub-
problems which have been calculated and recorded already. This procedure
basically implements the recurrence relation of the dynamic programming be-
ing performed. To describe this recurrence relation, we introduce the following
notation: An arrangement of a subproblem (Iℓ;i,j, f) is defined by a five-tuple
(s, PI, fl, fd, fr).
• The first two components (s, PI) describe the pivot, which is the candi-
date first punctured interval of a cover of the subproblem (Iℓ;i,j , f) from
the left. The node i ≤ s ≤ j is the starting index of the pivot and
PI stands for the punctured interval combination used. PI varies over
all possible punctured interval combinations, which we denote by PI,
specified by c and p. Of course, there are boundary constraints, i ≤ s
and s+ |PI| ≤ j, so that the pivot completely lies in Iℓ;i,j .
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of an arrangement (s, PI, fl, fd, fr) with a pivot. In
the picture, the subproblem being examined is (Iℓ;start,end), f and this is an
arrangement that possibly can lead to an optimal solution for this particular
subproblem. For each arrangement, there are four components that must be
added up: a single cost for the pivot PI itself, the cost of covering left handside
at the layer below, the cost of covering right handside at the same layer, and
the cost of covering the punctured places at the layer below.
• The last three components, (fl, fd, fr), describe a partitioning of the free
rider quota into three parts: intervals on the left, underneath, and right
of the pivot, respectively. For these values, we have the constraint that
fl + fd + fr = f − #rev(s, PI), where #rev(s, PI) is the number of
revoked users underneath the pivot. Because the pivot is assumed to be
taken into the cover, the revoked users under it are taken as free riders.
All possible arrangements are considered and the one that leads to the
least cost is taken. One additional possibility is that there are no punctured
intervals at layer ℓ in the optimal solution, which we will consider as another
arrangement. I.e., we must also check whether delegating the whole subprob-
lem to the lower layer would be better: whether cost[ℓ − 1, i.left, j.right, f ]
is better than all arrangements with a pivot at layer ℓ. Minimization is per-
formed over all possible arrangements together with this additional one. For
an illustration of an arrangement with a pivot, see Figure 4.4.
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In order to calculate the cost of an arrangement (s, PI, fl, fd, fr), first, we
allocate #rev(s, PI) free riders for taking the pivot to the cover. The rest of
the free rider quota is partitioned into three parts:
• left of the pivot in Iℓ;i,j (fl)
• punctures of the pivot (fd)
• right of the pivot in Iℓ;i,j (fr)
All possible distributions of the f − #rev(s, PI) free riders as fl + fd + fr
are considered and the cost associated with an arrangement (s, PI, fl, fd, fr)
is then calculated as the sum of four components:
1: A cost of 1 for the pivot itself.
cl: Cost of covering left of the pivot borrowed from the lower layers with fl
free riders. This cost is already calculated.
cr: Cost of covering right of the pivot at the same layer with fr free riders.
This cost is also already calculated.
cd: Cost of covering the punctures of the pivot with fd free riders borrowed
from the lower layer. Unlike the previous three, this cost will not be
readily available when there are more than one punctures of PI. In such
cases, a last nested minimization function must be performed over all
possible distributions of the fd free riders to the punctures of PI.
The values of cl and cr can be directly retrieved from the dynamic program-
ming table because according to the iteration order, they are already calculated
and recorded before. Calculation of cd requires one additional minimization
over all possible distributions of the free rider quota fd to the punctures of PI.
Before presenting the pseudocode, we first describe the output of the Comp-
MinCost procedure as a mathematical formula below. Here, PI denotes the
set of all possible punctured interval combinations.
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CompMinCost(ℓ, i, j, f) = min
i ≤ s ≤ j
PI ∈ PI
fl + fr + fd = fr
fl, fr, fd ≥ 0
{1 + cl + cr + cd}
where
cl = cost[ℓ− 1, i.left, s.left− 1, fl]
cr = cost[ℓ, s+ |PI|, j, fr]
κ = #(punctures of PI)
πx = xth puncture of PI
cd = min∑κ
x=1 fx = fd
{
κ∑
x=1
cost[ℓ− 1, πx.start.left, πx.end.right, fx]
}
Recall that the CompMinCost procedure is called in the last line of the
FindCost procedure. By doing so, we end up checking all possible pivots (in
the form of a valid punctured interval) within the examined interval and also
the additional arrangement without a pivot. We take the minimum of these
costs and return it to Algorithm 4 so that it can be recorded in the dynamic
programming table.
In its current, basic form, the OptimalPICoverc,p algorithm has a run-
ning time of O(logc n ·
(
n
3
) · c · p2 · (c
p
) · ( fr
p+2
)
).
4.3.3 Performance Improvement
As the reader might have already noticed, the efficiency of the optimal algo-
rithm is decreased mostly because of the fact that we need to calculate the
cost of covering all intervals at all layers. Therefore, it would be a good idea
to avoid any calculations that are unnecessary whenever we can detect them.
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Algorithm 6 CompMinCost(ℓ, i, j, f)
1: min←∞
2: for s from i to j do
3: for PI ∈ PI do
4: piv ← Sℓ,s,P I
5: κ← #(punctures of (piv))
6: #rev(piv)← #(revoked users under piv)
7: for fl from 0 to f −#rev(piv) do
8: for fd from 0 to f −#rev(piv)− fl do
9: fr ← f −#rev(piv)− fl − fd
10: // Investigating cost of the arrangement (piv, fl, fd, fr):
11: cost← 1 // Cost of the pivot
12: cost← cost+ cost[ℓ− 1, i.left, s.left− 1, fl]
13: cost← cost+ cost[ℓ, s+ |PI|, j, fr]
14: // We also need to add the cost for covering punctures:
15: mincostd ←∞
16: for each free rider partition f
(1)
d + f
(2)
d + . . .+ f
(κ)
d = fd do
17: costd ← 0
18: for x from 0 to κ do
19: πx ← xth puncture of piv
20: costd ← costd + cost[ℓ− 1, πx.left, πx.right, f (x)d ]
21: if costd < mincostd then
22: mincostd ← costd
23: cost← cost+mincostd
24: if cost < min then
25: min← cost
26: if cost[ℓ− 1, i.left, j.right, f ] < min then
27: min← cost[ℓ− 1, i.left, j.right, f ]
28: return min
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Theorem 4.3.1 Suppose that two consecutive nodes x and y at layer ℓ are
fully privileged. Then, an optimal cover exists where the users under x and y
are covered by a punctured interval at layer ℓ or above.
Proof Since the nodes x and y at layer ℓ are fully privileged, so are the 2c
nodes x.left through y.right at layer ℓ− 1, the 2c2 nodes x.left.left through
y.right.right at layer ℓ−2, and so on until the lowest layer. Note that covering
users beneath x and y at layer ℓ− 2 or below certainly brings much more cost
compared to covering them at layer ℓ− 1 because approximately c times more
subsets are needed for every lower layer.
Now, suppose that there exists an optimal cover C that covers users be-
neath x and y with subsets at layer ℓ − 1. Note that since C is an optimal
cover, the subsets of C that covers the users beneath x and y must be in the
following format: Sℓ−1;i,i+c−1, Sℓ−1;i+c,i+2c−1 and Sℓ−1;i+2c,j where i < x.left
and y.right < j as shown in Figure 4.5. This is because:
• if i = x.left and C was to include the subsets Sℓ−1;x.left,x.right and
Sℓ−1;y.left,y.right, we could replace both with only one subset Sℓ;x,y and
obtain a strictly better cover,
• and if i < x.left and C was to include the subsets Sℓ−1;i,i+c−1,
Sℓ−1;i+c,i+2c−1 and Sℓ−1;i+2c,y.right, we could replace these three subsets
with only two subsets Sℓ;x,y and Sℓ−1;i,x.left−1 and obtain a strictly better
cover again.
If C is indeed an optimal cover and therefore includes subsets Sℓ−1;i,i+c−1,
Sℓ−1;i+c,i+2c−1 and Sℓ−1;i+2c,j where i < x.left and y.right < j, in this case
we can construct another optimal cover by replacing these three subsets with
Sℓ−1;i,x.left−1, Sℓ;x,y and Sℓ−1;y.right+1,j . Hence, if x and y are fully privileged,
we can certainly obtain an optimal cover that covers users beneath x and y
with subsets at layer ℓ or above and this concludes the proof.
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Figure 4.5: Shows cover C covering users beneath x and y. If C is optimal,
another optimal cover that employs Sℓ;x,y can be found. Therefore, we can
avoid calculating the costs of the intervals that contains the interval x.left
through y.right.
Now, having proved this result, if two consecutive nodes x and y at layer
ℓ is fully privileged, we can safely avoid calculating costs for intervals at layer
ℓ − 1 that start at x.left or before and end at y.right or after. As a result
of this observation, we can reduce the running time of the optimal algorithm
significantly over populations where privileged users are dense.
4.4 Heuristic Approaches
In this section, we will provide two heuristics that give near-optimal results
while running significantly faster than the optimal algorithm. The top-down
heuristic basically traverses the user tree in a top-down fashion and greedily
takes punctured intervals conforming to the allowed free rider ratio into the
cover. The hybrid heuristic offers a trade-off between the accuracy of the
optimal algorithm and the speed of the top-down heuristic.
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4.4.1 Top-Down: A Greedy Heuristic
In this section, we will describe a greedy heuristic which runs much faster than
the optimal algorithm while reducing the transmission cost quite decently. The
basic idea of the algorithm is to start from the top layer, try to cover as much
as possible with the CoverLayer procedure conforming to a bound on the
ratio of free riders allowed and proceed to the lower layer. The top-down
heuristic is given in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 TopDownc,p(T ,cf )
1: fr ← ⌊cf · r⌋
2: df ← fr/ρ
3: C ← {}
4: for ℓ from ℓmax down to 0 do
5: CoverLayer(ℓ, df )
Algorithm 8, the CoverLayer procedure, works at a particular layer as
follows: From left to right, each node is considered as a potential starting
point of a punctured interval to be taken to the cover. Then, each possible
punctured interval starting at this node is considered one by one. As soon as
the procedure encounters a punctured interval which, if taken, will conform
to the allowed free rider ratio, it takes that punctured interval into the cover.
Then it continues considering punctured intervals starting from the node im-
mediately after the last one that had been taken to the cover. When it comes
to the end of the layer, it proceeds to the layer below.
We take the ratio fr/ρ where ρ is the number of all privileged users as
defined before. Now we have a ratio that can be used in a greedy choice.
Specifically, we look at the candidate punctured interval being investigated,
Scand, and take the ratio #rev(Scand)/#pri(Scand). If this ratio is less than or
equal to fr/ρ, this means that we can take this candidate punctured interval
into the cover. If we use the same criterion with all candidate intervals, note
that the resulting ratio will be less than or equal to fr/ρ.
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Algorithm 8 CoverLayer(ℓ, df )
1: offset← 0
2: fcur ← 0
3: while offset ≤ |T [ℓ]| do
4: for PI ∈ PI do
5: Scand ← Sℓ,offset,P I // Rename the candidate punctured interval
6: if #rev(Scand)/#pri(Scand) ≤ df then
7: C ← C ∪ Scand
8: fcur ← fcur +#rev(Scand)
9: Mark users under Scand as covered
10: offset← offset+ |PI| − 1
11: break for loop
12: offset← offset+ 1
4.4.2 Introducing Tolerance for Performance Improve-
ment
Although the top-down heuristic works quite well, there are some subtle issues
with it. Note that since we work on populations where the number of revoked
users are rather small, the ratio fr/ρ induced by fr/r turns out to be very
small. Unfortunately, this makes the top down heuristic rather ineffective
because at the higher layers, this small ratio is almost never met and everything
is left to the lowest layers where the transmission cost reduction will be limited.
This is against the idea of having layers in the first place.
In order to overcome this problem, we have another parameter ctol denoting
a tolerance factor, typically ctol ≥ 1. While making the greedy decision of
having a particular punctured interval into the cover or not, now we compare
the free rider ratio in that interval to ctol ·fr/ρ instead of fr/ρ alone. However,
at the same time, we do not forget the total number of free riders that can be
allowed, and we check whether having that interval in the cover will make the
total free rider count exceed the bound. So, line 6 of Algorithm 8 will become
6 : if #rev(Scand)/#pri(Scand) ≤ ctol · df and #rev(Scand) + fcur ≤ fr then
in the top-down algorithm parametrized with ctol.
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Empirical evidence suggests that this modification can indeed be used to
significantly increase the extent of reduction gained by the top-down heuristic.
This improvement is further investigated in Section 4.5 with experimental
results.
4.4.3 Hybrid Approach
In this section we will describe a mixed strategy which is a synthesis of the
optimal algorithm with the top-down heuristic. Recall how we improved the
performance of the optimal algorithm by first finding out the intervals which
must obviously be in an optimal cover anyway and avoiding the computations
for intervals that line beneath these nodes. Here, we slightly relax the selection
of such intervals by requiring a certain level of fullness instead of requiring them
to be full in terms of privileged users. Furthermore, we do not check individual
nodes but rather punctured intervals themselves as in the top-down heuristic,
instead. By doing so, the optimality of the result is compromised in return for
much higher speed.
In order to realize this, we first run the top-down heuristic once excluding
the lowest layer, but without adding any intervals into the cover. We only mark
the free riders that should have been marked in a top-down run. Next, the
dynamic programming phase is performed by treating the free riders marked
by the top-down run as privileged.
The HybridCover procedure is given in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 HybridCoverc,p(T ,cf )
1: fr ← ⌊cf · r⌋
2: Run TopDownc,p(T ,cf ) excluding the lowest layer
3: Update fr
4: Run OptimalPICoverc,p(T ,cf )
As a result, we can say that the basic idea of the hybrid approach is to avoid
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the computational cost of placing all free riders with dynamic programming
by employing a top-down pass first, placing a portion of the free rider quota,
and then performing the dynamic programming with the remaining free rider
quota optimally, which will take much less time since most of the free riders
will be placed in the top-down phase. Experimental results of this approach
are given in Section 4.5.
4.5 Experiments
In this section, we will first investigate the problem of choosing the tolerance
value that makes the top-down pass as effective as possible. Then we will
present our experimental results and discuss the performance of our methods.
4.5.1 Choosing the Tolerance Level
In Section 4.4.2, we explained the idea of tolerance that we use to improve
the effectiveness of the top-down pass. However, it was not clear how this
tolerance ratio should be chosen. Obviously, if the tolerance is too small, it
will have no effect. If it is too large, free riders will be spent wastefully in the
upper layers, and improvement will be limited. So, we want this tolerance to
be:
• large enough to allow the top-down heuristic to be as effective as possible,
• not too large to prevent the top-down pass to spend the free rider quota
wastefully.
Our experimental results (See Figures 4.6 and 4.7) suggest that the top-
down heuristic reaches its best performance when ctol is around 1/cf , and
for larger values of ctol almost no improvement is observed. This observation
can be explained as follows: Note that ctol · df = ctol · fr/ρ ≈ r/ρ gives
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ctol ≈ r/fr = 1/cf . Therefore, when ctol > 1/cf , this means that we allow
subsets with a privileged density even less than the overall privileged density
of all users. Obviously, assuming that a good cover consists of such low density
subsets is a bad idea. However, by allowing ctol value to be up to 1/cf we only
allow subsets that have a higher privileged density than the overall population.
This is a decent decision because such high-density subsets are indeed likely
to be in a good cover.
4.5.2 Transmission Complexity Experiments
In this section we will present our experimental results regarding both trans-
mission cost and execution time. Both types of plots are produced by the same
data randomly created for a population of 512 users. Note that such a mod-
erate population size is preferable because in subset framework BE systems, a
larger population it is typically partitioned into moderate-size populations and
each partition is handled separately [3]. Several combinations of the following
parameters are tested:
• c = 16, 32
• p = 1, 2
• cf = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5
• ctol = 1.5, 2.0, 3.3, 10.0
The parameters c and p were chosen according to [17] and also our population
size of 512. The cf values are selected as 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 because one would
allow only a small portion of the revoked users to be free rider and keep
majority of them as revoked. The ctol values are chosen according to cf values
and the results of Section 4.5.1.
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Results are given as a plot of transmission cost and execution time with
respect to the ratio of privileged users in the population. Since we are inter-
ested in the mostly-privileged populations, we give the results for populations
with a privileged ratio above 75%.
Figures 4.8 through 4.10 show the improvement in the transmission cost.
It is observed that the cost can be reduced quite dramatically depending on
cf .
Figures 4.11 through 4.13 show the average execution times of our methods.
Note that, considering both the transmission cost and execution time plots,
it can be argued that the hybrid method reduces the transmission cost quite
decently while running much faster than the optimal algorithm. This trade-off
appears best when cf is about 0.3.
4.6 Discussion
The PI scheme is currently one of the most efficient BE schemes. In this chap-
ter, we examined the question of how the performance of the PI scheme can
be further improved by allowing a limited number of free riders. We gave a
dynamic programming optimization algorithm as well as a top-down heuristic
which decently decreases transmission overhead while running extremely fast.
We parametrized our heuristic with a tolerance parameter to use it more ef-
fectively. We also proposed a hybrid approach that first performs a top-down
pass and then runs the same dynamic programming algorithm to offer a trade-
off between speed and optimality. We conducted experiments to analyze the
transmission costs obtained by different methods. Experiments showed that
it is possible to obtain much reduced transmission complexities with the PI
scheme by tolerating a limited number of free riders.
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(a) c = 16, p = 1
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(b) c = 32, p = 1
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(c) c = 16, p = 2
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Figure 4.6: Results of the experiments for the optimal tolerance value, for
cf = 0.3. Note that regardless of the privileged user ratio, that are chosen as
70%, 80% and 90%, improvement stops after ctol = 1/cf = 3.3.
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(b) c = 32, p = 1
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(c) c = 16, p = 2
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0
N
um
be
r o
f T
ra
ns
m
iss
io
ns
ctol
Top-Down, 70%
Top-Down, 80%
Top-Down, 90%
(d) c = 32, p = 2
Figure 4.7: Results of the experiments for the optimal tolerance value, for
cf = 0.5. Note that the improvement stops after ctol = 1/cf = 2.0 this time.
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Figure 4.8: Average number of transmissions of the algorithms where f/r = 0.1
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Figure 4.9: Average number of transmissions of the algorithms where f/r = 0.3
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Figure 4.10: Average number of transmissions of the algorithms where f/r =
0.5
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Figure 4.11: Average time complexity of the algorithms in terms of seconds
where f/r = 0.1, in logarithmic scale.
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Figure 4.12: Average time complexity of the algorithms in terms of seconds
where f/r = 0.3, in logarithmic scale.
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Figure 4.13: Average time complexity of the algorithms in terms of seconds
where f/r = 0.5, in logarithmic scale.
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Chapter 5
Generic Trace and Revoke using
Broadcast Encryption
Recall that in a digital content distribution setting, the content is encrypted
such that the intended authorized users, having access to the decryption keys,
are capable of receiving the transmission. This task is handled by broadcast
encryption (BE) schemes as we mentioned in the previous chapters. However,
this might not be sufficient to achieve an adequate access control.
A shortcoming of BE schemes in general is the possibility of the illegal
redistribution of the content by the authorized receivers to others. This can
be possible by issuing a malicious decoder that circumvents the access control
used by the content distribution system. Following the standard terminology,
the decoder created by an adversary is called a pirate decoder, the users that
divulge their keys to the adversary are called traitors and such keys are called
traitor keys. The sender may want to restrict this type of behavior since
such adversarial behavior introduces additional unauthorized receivers in the
system. Traitor tracing is such a deterrence mechanism where an authority is
capable of performing an analysis to any working pirate decoder and recovering
at least one of the traitor keys that were used in its construction. Traitor
tracing emerged first in the work of Chor, Fiat and Naor [32] as a solution.
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Recall that we will consider black-box tracing where the tracing authority
interacts with the pirate decoder in a black-box manner: querying the decoder
with inputs and observing the responses of the decoder. Majority of the works,
[35, 36, 37, 32, 38, 39, 40, 41], in the traitor tracing literature supports black-
box tracing.
Trace and Revoke Schemes: As we have discussed above, traitor tracing
and broadcast encryption has their own functionalities. However, for most of
the digital content distribution systems, the ultimate goal is to combine both,
so that any receiver key found to be compromised in a tracing process can be
revoked in future transmissions. This is introduced by Naor and Pinkas in [42].
However, it is not possible to achieve this trivially, and a naive combination
of both mechanisms would severely fail as discussed in the subsequent works
[43, 44, 12]. The subset cover framework of [12] leads to a number of schemes
[14, 13] which rely on combinatorial structures and support somewhat weak
tracing in the symmetric setting (the tracing does not guarantee to identify a
traitor but rather disables the pirate decoder). This weakness leads to a new
type of attack called Pirate Evolution [45]. The studies on trace and revoke
schemes followed in the public key setting [43, 46].
Tracing and Revoking Pirate Rebroadcasts: In fact, any content distribu-
tion system is vulnerable to much more serious attack of rebroadcasting: in a
pirate rebroadcast the pirate instead of issuing a malicious decoder it simply
publishes the content. Evidently, this defeats any mechanism that requires an
interaction with the pirate decoder with some specially designed ciphertexts
like the above mechanisms we discussed so far. Pirate rebroadcasting is in-
troduced as an attack concept by Fiat and Tassa [56] and further studied in
[57]. Needless to say, merely tracing pirate rebroadcasts is of little use and one
should be able to revoke the involved traitor keys.
A trace and revoke scheme that is able to guard against pirate rebroadcasts
is implemented as part of the AACS standard [16]. The scheme is presented
and its security and performance is analyzed in Jin and Lotspiech [58] with
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further analysis in [44] by Kiayias and Pehlivanoglu that revealed some limita-
tions of that construction. In [44], tracing and revoking pirate rebroadcasting
was formally modeled and a scheme for tracing and revoking an unlimited
number of users was introduced. This is the only efficient trace and revoke
scheme available, but restricted to the symmetric case with an underlying
combinatorial key-distribution method based on subset cover framework.
Public Traceability: In Eurocrypt 2005, Chabanne, Phan and Pointcheval
[59] introduced the notion of public traceability where tracing requires no
secrets. A two user solution was presented in [59] and further improved to
the multiuser setting with short transmissions in [38] and [60] by employing
fingerprinting codes. However, the public key and the private key sizes are
all linear in length of the fingerprinting code employed for key distribution.
The trace and revoke scheme of [43] is also publicly traceable with shorter key
sizes, i.e. O(
√
n) many, but requires higher bandwidth, i.e. it has a ciphertext
length of O(
√
n).
5.1 Technical Background for Traitor Tracing
The majority of the black-box traitor tracing schemes share the same tracing
strategy that is called ’hybrid coloring’ in [39] or ’linear tracing’ in [40] and is
inherent almost in all black-box traitor tracing mechanisms. This strategy can
be summarized in the following fashion: The pirate decoder is queried with
a sequence of special tracing ciphertexts that are gradually randomizing the
way receivers decrypt. In this sequence, while the first special ciphertext is
decryptable by all receivers, the last one is decryptable by none. In between,
a ‘walking procedure’ is processed where the i-th type of tracing ciphertext
disables the first i receivers in decrypting the transmission. This is repeated
many times to approximate the success rates of the decoder in decrypting each
type of tracing ciphertext. Finally, the traitor key used in the construction of
the pirate decoder is inferred by an analysis of the success rates.
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The technique above yields a trivial traitor tracing system with each user
having a unique decryption key. The ciphertext size would be very high (as
much as n/2) in average and n in the worst case. For better trade-offs, the same
technique can trivially be applied over more flexible key-distribution methods
like the schemes based on fingerprinting codes [32, 39] or combinatorial struc-
tures [14, 13, 12]. In the public key setting, a number of tracing schemes (e.g.
[37, 43, 46, 41]) also build their tracing strategies on ’linear tracing’ technique:
the pirate decoder is queried with specially crafted tracing ciphertexts that
allows the walking procedure implicitly. The difficulty of designing such a
scheme can be shown in the example of [41] which is broken independently by
[61] and [62].
In the case of tracing and revoking, the same technique is found to be useful
but the underlying multiuser encryption scheme is needed to be designed with
much more demanding property. Boneh et al. [43] fulfills this by introducing
an Augmented Broadcast Encryption scheme which supports revocation of any
subset, i.e. the scheme can be used purely as broadcast encryption scheme,
and further allows walking procedure within any enabled subset. This will
eventually lead to the application of the basic linear tracing strategy and
hence to the identification of a traitor. The traitor then can be easily revoked
as the scheme supports any further revocation.
Fingerprinting codes [63, 32, 64] are one of the basic mathematical tools
in the design of tracing mechanisms. The fingerprinting codes, in the context
of tracing, have been used (in almost all of the schemes they are employed
including but not limited to [35, 36, 32, 38, 58, 39, 60, 57]) to shape the
key-distribution so that each receiver gets a unique set of keys.
In this long sequence of works, there are various trade-offs between a num-
ber of important efficiency characteristics of traitor tracing schemes: (i) the
ciphertext size, (ii) public key size: more specifically the length of the encryp-
tion key and (iii) private key size: the key-storage required in the subscriber
side. These quantities are typically expressed as a function of the number
of users n, some error probability and an upper bound on the number of
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corrupted users. Of particular interest, tracing scheme of [37] has constant
private key size and O(
√
n) ciphertext size and public key size while the trace
and revoke scheme of [43] has all parameters in O(
√
n). The application of the
standard tracing strategy in a trace and revoke scheme increases dramatically
the private key size from constant to quadratic in number of users.
Recently, new applications of fingerprinting codes have been introduced in
[44, 40], where the code is imposed on the interaction of the tracer and the
pirate decoder to observe the way the decoder responds back. This is a quite
different approach compared to the conventional use of fingerprinting codes
for individualizing each receiver (as in the case of virtually all earlier works we
cited above) through key-distribution. This new application of fingerprinting
codes leads to strong results: [44] introduces the first trace and revoke system
against pirate rebroadcasts with unlimited number of traitors and revocations
and [40] introduces a faster tracing strategy that can be used to replace linear
tracing strategy. Following a similar approach, our goal is to transform a
broadcast encryption scheme into a trace and revoke scheme.
5.2 Our Contributions
The present work has the following major contributions:
1. We present a generic transformation of a broadcast encryption scheme
into a trace and revoke scheme. The transformation preserves the public and
private key sizes of the underlying scheme while factors the ciphertext length
with some q value that is related to the traitor coalition size the scheme will
be resistant to.
As it is evident in the following Table 5.2 where we give three instantiations
of our generic transformation applied to the BE schemes of [21, 65, 66] with the
use of open Chor-Fiat-Naor code of [32], our results outperform the existing
trace and revoke schemes of [43, 46]. In particular, we obtain the first trace
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and revoke scheme with constant private key size in the standard model. The
scheme of [46] can be proven in generic group model. Some weaknesses in that
group model has been discussed in [67] which are similar to the ones in the
random oracle model.
The schemes of [68] and [69] supports a weaker traceability (they do not
guarantee to identify a traitor but rather disables the pirate decoder) similar
to the subset cover framework based tracing and revoking [12]. Hence, we did
not include these works in the table for comparison.
Trace-only Public Private Ciphertext Security
Schemes Key Size Key Size Size & Type
BSW[37] O(
√
n) O(1) O(
√
n) Static
ADMNPS[35] O(n2 log n
ǫ
) O(1) O(n2 log n
ǫ
) Ad/ID-based
Public Private Ciphertext Security
Trace&Revoke Key Size Key Size Size & Type
BW[43] O(
√
n) O(
√
n) O(
√
n) Adaptive
FA[46] O(n) O(1) O(
√
n) Ad/Generic GM
Our Results
T&R-BGW1[21] O(n) O(1) O(1) Static
T&R-BGW2[21] O(
√
n) O(1) O(
√
n) Static
T&R-Del1[65] O(n) O(1) O(1) Static/ID-based
T&R-Del2[65] O(
√
n) O(1) O(
√
n) Static/ID-based
T&R-GW1[66] O(m) O(1) O(1) Static
T&R-GW2[66] O(n) O(1) O(1) Ad/ROM/ID-based
T&R-GW3[66] O(
√
n) O(1) O(
√
n) Ad/ID-based
Table 5.1: Our construction applied to the BE schemes of [21, 65, 66] are
compared with the T&R scheme of [43] and traitor tracing-only schemes of
[35] and [37]. m in GW1 is the maximum number of recipients in a single
broadcast and ǫ in ADMNPS is the probability of tracing failure.
2. Of particular interest, the generic construction instantiated by [65] and
[66] yields the first identity based trace and revoke scheme against both static
and adaptive adversary. Recall again that the ID-based scheme of [69] supports
a weaker traceability, hence we do not consider it for a comparison in here.
3. We define, for the first time, the concept of the public samplability of a
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fingerprinting code which was crucial in the design of our construction. We also
highlight an advantage of open fingerprinting codes over secret codes despite
the fact that the secrete codes like [63, 64] are shorter. It is left open for future
studies, to elaborate on the best design of a publicly samplable fingerprinting
codes which can be useful in the type of transformation we have designed in
this work.
4. The publicly traceable schemes of [38] and [60] suffers from long public
and private keys that are typically O(n2). The trace and revoke scheme of [43]
also supports public tracing but still the private key size and the ciphertext
length is a function of the number of users. Our generic construction does not
require any tracing secret key, hence supports fully public traceability as well
as revocation. This gives us the first publicly traceable schemes with constant
private key sizes while achieving short transmissions that is a function of the
number of traitors only.
5. In [44], tracing and revoking pirate rebroadcasting was formally mod-
eled and a scheme for tracing and revoking an unlimited number of users
was shown. This is the only available and efficient trace and revoke scheme,
but restricted to the symmetric case with an underlying combinatorial key-
distribution method based on subset cover framework.
Our generic construction, by adapting the way the ciphertext is prepared,
fulfills the need for tracing and revoking pirate rebroadcasts in the public
key setting. The instantiations provided in the table presented above would
work smoothly leading to a number of schemes against pirate rebroadcast with
several different efficiency parameters and security types.
6. In this work, we only have generic construction based on a new tracing
strategy and we didn’t look for any advantage of a specialized underlying
multiuser encryption scheme. We open a new direction of designing traitor
tracing schemes: a multiuser encryption scheme that supports the tracing
idea given in Section 5.5 may lead traitor tracing schemes that outperform the
existing schemes. This is left open for further studies.
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5.3 Preliminaries and Definitions
This section summarizes the notions of broadcast encryption and trace and
revoke systems, and fingerprinting codes while explaining the notation that
we will use throughout the chapter. We also give security definitions, which
we will adhere to, to prove the security of our scheme. But before proceeding
with the definitions, we first refer to Chernoff bounds, to be employed in our
analysis later in Section 5.5.4:
Theorem 5.3.1 (Chernoff Bound) Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent Bernoulli
trials such that Pr[Xi] = pi. Let X =
∑i=1
n Xi and µ = E[X]. Then,
∀0 < δ < 1, P r[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−µδ2/3,
∀0 < δ < 1, P r[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ e−µδ2/2.
It immediately follows from Theorem 5.3.1 that
∀0 < δ < 1, P r[|X − µ| ≥ δµ] ≤ 2e−µδ2/3 = 2e−(µδ)2/3µ
5.3.1 Broadcast Encryption in KEM structure
As we know from the previous sections, a broadcast encryption (BE) scheme
is a method for encrypting messages in a way that only an intended recipient
set, which we call the privileged users, will be able to decrypt it, and even
if all other users, which we call the revoked users, collude, they cannot get
any information about the message. The broadcast encryption schemes in
the previous chapters were in the subset cover framework, and their working
principle was depending on combinatorial structures defined on the user set.
The rest was making several symmetric encryptions for each subset. Not all BE
schemes is in this form. Also, the previous sections were not about security and
their concern was rather performance. Therefore, we have not investigated the
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inside of a BE scheme yet. In this section, we will see the the algorithms that
form a BE scheme and security definitions that they are required to satisfy.
Basically, there are two requirements for a BE scheme:
1. Correctness: Any non-revoked user must be able to decrypt the message
correctly.
2. Security: Any coalition of revoked users must be unable to get any non-
trivial information about the message.
In a content distribution setting with revocation, the actual data is usually
encrypted with a standard, symmetric message encryption scheme while the
symmetric key used in that encryption is transmitted with the BE scheme.
The reason is that the data that needs to be encrypted is typically too long
and encrypting the whole data directly with the BE scheme is too expensive.
This hybrid approach will still be successful in disabling the revoked users from
decrypting the content as the symmetric key will not be available to them. In
the literature, the terminology of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and
data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) has been used (see [70] where these no-
tions are discussed in the context of public key cryptography). In our setting,
the DEM part consists of only symmetric encryption of the transmitted data
whereas the KEM part is the broadcast encryption component that encap-
sulates the symmetric encryption key which is used in the DEM part. Our
definition for broadcast encryption will be in the KEM structure.
We will consider BE schemes in the form of three algorithms:
(KeyDist(1n), Encrypt(PK, S), Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr)). Throughout the
chapter we will denote the set of all users {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n]. The functional-
ities of these algorithms are given below:
• KeyDist(1n) algorithm generates private keys for users i ∈ [n] denoted
by ski and a public key denoted by PK.
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• Encrypt(PK, S) algorithm prepares a header hdr and a key K for a
receiver set S ⊆ [n] using public key PK. K is the symmetric message
encryption key which will be used later in the DEM phase. In a broad-
cast, hdr is transmitted so that non-revoked users can use it to recover
K.
• Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr) algorithm takes a private key ski and some
header hdr and returns a key from the key-space of the symmetric en-
cryption key which will be used later in the DEM phase.
As we will argue in coming sections, we require correctness and security
for an encryption (hdr,K) that is output by Encrypt(PK, S). Informally
speaking, by calling the Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr) function we should have (i)
correctness: the i-th receiver having the private key ski must succeed to recover
K if i ∈ S, and (ii) security: the output of the algorithm must reveal no
nontrivial information about K if if i /∈ S.
5.3.1.1 Correctness
A BE scheme in the KEM model satisfies correctness property if a user in
the intended recipient set can decrypt and recover the symmetric key K us-
ing the header hdr and the private key ski. Formally stated, a BE scheme
is correct if ∀PK, ∀S ⊆ [n], ∀i ∈ S, Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr)= K, whenever
(PK, sk1, . . . , skn)← KeyDist(1n) and (hdr,K)←Encrypt(PK, S).
5.3.1.2 Security
Semantic security against chosen plaintext and ciphertext attacks for BE
schemes is defined via a game between an attacker A and a challenger C.
However, schemes proposed so far do not agree on one particular security def-
inition, rather each scheme has its own. This is inevitable due to the nature
of BE schemes because unlike classical public-key encryption schemes, there
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are many recipients, thus private keys, and there is a wider range of attacks.
Recall that in public-key schemes, there is only one private key being attacked
and therefore in attack models, only decryption oracles are employed to give
power to the attacker. In BE schemes, however, the attacker may also be
allowed to capture the private keys of some of the users and the attack is
performed against another group of users disjoint from the ones private keys
of which are captured. Also, there are differences depending on whether the
scheme is a public-key one or identity-based. First of all, the definition of
the user set differs significantly depending on this distinction. Since we will
give instantiations of our generic method on both cases, we will discuss both
security definitions.
In ID-based BE schemes, there is no pre-defined user set, and the attacker
usually chooses the set of IDs it wishes to attack at the beginning. Also,
in public-key BE schemes, the user set can be fixed at the beginning, and
the attacker can choose the set of users it wishes to attack again at the very
beginning, even before seeing the public key. Indeed, this is what most of
the previously proposed schemes (particularly [21] and [65]) considered their
security game models. However, in [66], Gentry and Waters gave more power
to the attacker by allowing it to capture private keys adaptively and then
choose the target set. In this model, unlike [21] and [65], the attacker captures
private keys and selects target set after seeing the public key.
One similarity of these schemes is that they are all semantically secure.
Since the attack games of [21] and [65] is almost the same, we will adopt this
version of the BE attack game. In this game, the attacker first chooses the
target set and gets the private keys of other users along with the public key.
Then decryption query phase 1 is followed by the challenge and the decryption
query phase 2 and then attacker makes its guess on the challenge.
Game 1 (Broadcast KEM-IND Game) Both the attacker A and the
challenger C are given the number of users, n.
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• Initialize. A chooses a victim subset S∗ ⊂ [n] to attack.
• Setup. The challenger C runs KeyDist(1n) to obtain private keys
sk1, . . . , skn and the public key PK. Then, C sends all private keys of
receivers that are not in S∗ (i.e., all ski such that i /∈ S∗) and the public
key PK to A.
• Decryption Query (phase 1). (only in CCA1 and CCA2 attacks) A
adaptively makes queries of the form (i, S, hdr) where i ∈ S ⊆ [n]\S∗.
Upon receiving a query, C responds with the result of the corresponding
decryption operation Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr).
• Challenge. C runs algorithm Encrypt(PK, S∗) and obtain (hdr∗, K∗).
Then it picks a random bit b and sets K0 = K
∗ and K1 is randomly
selected from the symmetric key space KSYM. It forms the challenge
string as (hdr,Kb) and sends the challenge to A.
• Decryption Query (phase 2). (only in CCA2 attacks) A again adap-
tively makes queries that are formed the same way as in the Decryption
Query (phase 1) with the only difference that A cannot use the header
in the challenge string in these queries. C responds as in phase 1.
• Guess. The attacker A guesses b′ for b and wins if b′ = b.
Having this definition, if we allow both decryption query phases, we obtain
the KEM-IND-CCA2 game for KEM-type BE schemes. The semantic security
of a BE scheme against CCA2 attacks in the KEM setting is then defined as
follows:
Definition A KEM-type BE scheme B is KEM-IND-CCA2 secure if for any
polynomial time attacker A in the KEM-IND-CCA2 game 1:
AdvA = |Pr[A wins]− 1/2| = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| ≤ ǫ
where AdvA denotes the advantage of the attacker A for winning the security
game and ǫ is negligible in terms of the security parameter of the system.
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If we allow only decryption query phase 1, we obtain the KEM-IND-CCA1
game for KEM-type BE schemes. Therefore, we say that a KEM-type BE
scheme is KEM-IND-CCA1 secure if it satisfies the same definition without
the second query phase.
Similarly, if we allow none of the decryption query phases, we obtain the
KEM-IND-CPA game for KEM-type BE schemes. Then, A KEM-type BE
scheme is KEM-IND-CPA secure if it satisfies Definition 5.3.1.2 without the
query phases.
Note that in Game 1, the adversary chooses the set it will attack at the
very beginning, specifically before the keys are created by the challenger. This
is called a static attack. Again, recall that Gentry and Waters [66] achieves
adaptive security by allowing the attacker to choose the users to be corrupted,
adaptively, after getting the public key. After retrieving enough keys, the
remaining users form the target set to attack.
5.3.2 Trace and Revoke Systems
A trace and revoke (T&R) system is a system which has tracing and revoking
capabilities. In this context, tracing is about detecting users who leak their
decryption keys, and revoking is about invalidating the keys of such users so
that the key leakage that took is neutralized. A trace and revoke system can
be obtained by adding a tracing algorithm on top of a BE scheme. The tracing
algorithm ensures the detection of the traitor receivers whose keys might have
been used for creating the pirate decryption box being traced. Afterwards,
they may simply be added to a black list so that whenever a new broadcast is
to be made, the system can make sure that these receivers are in the revoked
set.
In order for the tracing algorithm to identify a traitor we need to make
a necessary assumption that the pirate decoder succeeds in decrypting ci-
phertexts intended for at least one subset with a non-negligible probability.
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Otherwise, it is theoretically impossible to assert any tracing capability since
it is trivial to construct such a decoder without any decryption keys. There-
fore, throughout the chapter, we say a decryption box is a (σ, S)-pirate if its
rate of correctly decrypting broadcasts to set S is at least σ. We denote such
a pirate decoder by DσS. Upon encountering a decoder, we will assume that S
is known to the tracer. This is a reasonable assumption and holds for almost
all existing trace and revoke schemes in the literature like in [43, 68, 46]. A
working pirate decoder eventually will also reveal its σ value which can be
approximated by the tracer. Hence, from now on we will assume that both S
and σ can be extracted from the description of DσS:
The formal definition of a T&R system which consists of four algorithms,
is given below.
• Setup(1n) is a probabilistic algorithm run by the broadcaster. It takes
the number of users 1n and generate keys (PK, sk1, . . . , skn, TK). PK is
the public key while ski is the private key of i
th user. TK is the tracing
key, which is used for tracing and it may possibly be empty depending
on the design of the system.
• Transmit(PK, S) is a probabilistic algorithm run by the broadcaster.
It takes a subset S ⊆ [n], public key PK, and outputs a header Hdr and
a symmetric key K.
• Receive(PK, ski, c) is run by the user i. It takes a ciphertext c that is
produced for a set S and the private key ski of the user and successfully
decrypts and recovers K if and only if user i is in S.
• Trace(S,DσS, PK, TK) algorithm is run by the broadcaster. It takes
a set S together with a pirate decryption box for this set, DσS (i.e. a
(σ, S)-pirate decoder), the public key PK, and the tracing key TK, and
it outputs a set A of accused traitors whose key(s) must have contributed
in the construction of DσS.
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We again call the pair 〈S, hdr〉 full header. The trace and revoke schemes of
[43, 46], that we included in Table 5.2 for comparison, transmit the full header
as a broadcast. Hence, the receivers will be able to access the information of
S to run the decryption algorithm.
Black box tracing: In practice, it may not be possible for the tracer to
reverse-engineer the pirate decoder and directly find out the keys used in the
construction of the decoder, e.g. such a case is when the tracer has only
remote-access to a pirate decoder or when the code of the decoder is obfus-
cated. The tracer can be modeled as making queries to the pirate decryption
box and observing whether it decrypts or not. The tracing process with such
kind of restrictions placed on the tracer is called black-box tracing as the
accepted interaction between the tracer and the decoder consists of only in-
put/output communication. In the literature, almost all of the positive results
in designing traitor tracing schemes (including the schemes that we compare
to our constructions) are based further on two assumptions: (i) resettability,
i.e., the decoder does not maintain state during the tracing process, and (ii)
availability, i.e., the pirate decoder remains available as long as the tracing
process wishes to experiment with it. In this chapter, we consider black-box
tracing against resettable and available pirate decoders.
5.3.2.1 Correctness
The correctness property that a T&R system must satisfy is the same as that
of a BE scheme. Formally stated, ∀S ⊆ [n], ∀i ∈ S, and ∀Hdr, it holds
that Receive(PK, ski, Hdr) = K provided that (PK, sk1, . . . , skn, TK) ←
Setup(1n) and (Hdr,K)←Transmit(PK, S).
5.3.2.2 Security
There are two kinds of security goals in a T&R system. The first one is about
the confidentiality of the message. The second one is about the tracing ability
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of the system. We will define these security goals via two games, namely
message confidentiality game for the former and tracing game for the latter.
The message confidentiality game is very similar to the Broadcast KEM-
IND-CCA Game defined in the context of BE security in Section 6.1.2. How-
ever, to avoid any confusion we define it here as well, with the algorithm names
defined for T&R systems.
Game 2 (Message Confidentiality Game) Both the attacker A and the
challenger C are given the number of receivers, n.
• Initialize. A chooses a victim subset S∗ ⊂ [n] to get their private keys
from C.
• Setup. The challenger C runs Setup(1n) to obtain private keys
sk1, . . . , skn, tracing key TK, and public key PK. Then, C sends all
private keys of receivers that are not in S∗ (i.e., all ski such that i /∈ S∗)
and the public key PK to A.
• Decryption Query (phase 1). (only in CCA1 and CCA2 attacks) A
adaptively makes queries of the form (i, S,Hdr) where i ∈ S and Hdr
is a header. Upon receiving a query, C responds with the result of the
corresponding decrpytion operation Receive(PK, ski, S,Hdr).
• Request challenge. After completing its queries, A sends a challenge
request message to the challenger C.
• Challenge. C first runs algorithm Transmit(PK, S∗) and obtains
(Hdr∗, K∗). Then it picks a random bit b and generates a random sym-
metric key Kr. It sets K
+ = K∗ if b = 1 and K+ = Kr otherwise.
Finally, it sends (Hdr∗, K+) to A as the challenge.
• Decryption Query (phase 2). (only in CCA2 attacks) A adaptively
makes queries of the same form as the Decryption Query (phase 1) with
the difference that A cannot use the challenge header Hdr∗ in these
queries. C responds as in phase 1.
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• Guess. The attacker A guesses b′ for b and wins if b′ = b.
As in BE confidentiality, we define semantic security as follows:
Definition A T&R system T is IND-CCA2 secure if for any polynomial time
attacker A allowed to make polynomially many queries both phases in the
IND-CCA2 Game 2:
AdvA = |Pr[A wins]− 1/2| = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| ≤ ǫ
where AdvA denotes the advantage of the attacker A for winning the security
game and ǫ is negligible in terms of the security parameter of the system.
If we allow only decryption query phase 1, we obtain the IND-CCA1 game.
Thus we say that a T&R system is IND-CCA1 or IND-CPA secure if it satisfies
the security definition above without the second query phase or none of the
query phases, respectively.
Correctness and confidentiality definitions for T&R schemes are the same as
their BE counterparts. So we skip them here. There is one additional property
for T&R systems, though, which is traceability. Traceability is defined via the
following game between an attacker A and a challenger C:
Game 3 (Tracing Game) Both A and C are given the number of users, n,
and the upper bound t on traitor coalition size.
• Request. A chooses a traitor subset T of size at most t and requests
their private keys from C.
• Provide. C runs Setup(1n) to obtain the keys. Then, C sends all ski
such that i ∈ T and the public key PK to A. It keeps the tracing key
TK.
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• Forge decoder. A chooses a set S, and creates a (σ, S)-pirate decoder
box DσS which, by definition, correctly decrypts the broadcasts to set S
with probability at least σ. It outputs DσS.
• Trace. The challenger C runs Trace(S,DσS, PK, TK) to obtain an ac-
cused traitor set A ⊆ S.
Attacker A wins the game if the set A is empty or it is not a subset of T .
Definition We say that T= (Setup, Transmit, Receive, Trace) is a T&R
scheme with tracing success probability α against t-coalition σ-pirates if no
polynomial time attacker A, forging a σ-decoder by corrupting a traitor coali-
tion of size t, can win the game described above with probability more than
1− α.
5.4 Fingerprinting Codes
Fingerprinting codes were originally proposed for marking sold copies of easily
reproducible digital contents in order to prevent piracy. The idea is that
each copy is marked in a different way, in such a way that when one or more
malicious users form a coalition and reproduce a pirate copy, upon recovery of
this copy, the seller would be able to identify at least one of the users in the
coalition.
Fingerprinting codes are mathematically formulated as matrices where each
row of the code matrix, i.e. each codeword is associated with a copy to be sold,
and used to mark this copy in a unique way. This marking can be thought as
changing certain bits in a digital content according to the associated codeword,
but in such a way that these changes will not affect the quality of the digital
content recognizable to the human eye/ear. Later, when a coalition with
different copies with different marks come together, although they may find
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out some of these marks, and play with them, they will not be able to form a
new copy that will lead the seller to an innocent user.
In order to perform the functionalities explained above, fingerprinting codes
are defined by two algorithms, CodeGen and Identify. CodeGen(1n) outputs
a pair (C, tk) where C is an (ℓ, n, q)-code with alphabet Q such that |Q| = q,
and tk is a key for identifying purposes which can possibly be empty. Here,
ℓ and n are the length and number of codewords (rows) of the code (matrix).
Identify(C, tk, c) outputs either ⊥ or a codeword index t which is supposed
to be the index of a user in the coalition that must have forged a copy marked
with codeword c.
In the context of fingerprinting codes, adversaries can be modeled as an
algorithm Forge run by a coalition C and forges a pirate codeword. Regarding
the forgery operation, the set desc(CT ) = {x ∈ Qℓ : x[i] ∈ {a[i] : a ∈ CT}, 1 ≤
i ≤ ℓ} is called the descendant set of CT ⊆ C where x[i], a[i] are the i-th
symbols of the related vectors. Intuitively, it is the set of codewords, letters of
which must be equal to at least one of the letters of the coalition codewords
at each position. For example, if two codewords in the coalition are {1, 0, 1, 1}
and {0, 0, 0, 1} in a binary code, the descendant set of this coalition would
include the following four possible pirate codewords: {0, 0, 0, 1}, {0, 0, 1, 1},
{1, 0, 0, 1}, {1, 0, 1, 1}. So, piracy inside an (ℓ, n, q)-code C is equivalent to
producing a valid pirate codeword p ∈ desc(CT ) out of the codewords available
to a traitor coalition T . Such restriction on the pirate codeword production
is called ‘marking assumption’ and it holds in any reasonable piracy setting
(including Boneh-Shaw codes).
The performance of a fingerprinting code against a Forge algorithm is
evaluated according to its capability of identifying traitor codewords forged
by that particular Forge algorithm.
Definition We say that an (ℓ, n, q)-fingerprinting code (CodeGen, Identify)
is an (α,w)-identifier if the following holds: Given (tk, C) ← CodeGen(1n),
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and a Forge algorithm satisfying marking assumption,
∀T ⊆ U s.t. |T | ≤ w
Pr [∅ ( Identify(C, tk, p) ⊆ T ] ≥ 1− α
where p← Forge(C).
When the failure probability α = 0, we say it is a w-identifier fingerprinting
code. If we also have w = n, we call it a fully collusion resistant fingerprinting
code. The generated code C is not kept hidden from the Forge algorithm.
This does not contradict with the marking assumption since the piracy is
made possible through the marks available to the pirate. Such fingerprinting
code is called open fingerprinting code. If the Forge algorithm is restricted
to the information of CT = {cj|j ∈ T} with C = {c1, . . . , cn}, then we call
the fingerprinting code secret code. While the fingerprinting code of [32] is an
open code, the binary fingerprinting codes of Boneh-Shaw [63] and Tardos [64]
codes are secret codes.
When forging a pirate codeword, the adversary may choose some bits to
replace with some symbol not equal to zero or one which will be denoted by
‘?’. Although the positions where the bits are deleted are known to the iden-
tifier, this significantly complicates the identification. This is quite reasonable
adversarial behavior in the context of traitor tracing where the pirate may
deny to decrypt some type of transmissions. In producing a pirate codeword,
such pirate’s anti-tracing strategy corresponds to choosing ‘?’ marks in some
of the codeword positions.
Following the model of [36]: the j-th position, for 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, in an (ℓ, n, 2)
binary fingerprinting code is called undetectable for set T if the j-th bits of
traitor codewords CT all coincide; and detectable otherwise. A binary fin-
gerprinting code is δ-robust (α,w)-identifier if the Definition 5.4 holds for
any forging algorithm (again satisfies marking assumption) that can produce
p ∈ {0, 1, ?}ℓ, but the number of positions with pj =? is not larger than δ · ℓ.
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Boneh and Naor, in [36] further presented a construction for δ-robust finger-
printing codes. Later, an improved robust fingerprinting code is introduced in
[71] that has an optimal length.
5.5 Generic T&R scheme
In this section we will give a method to convert any BE scheme into a T&R
scheme: the revocation is handled by the direct revocation functionality of the
underlying BE scheme while the tracing is made possible through a special
design of tracing ciphertexts. Informally stated, we do the following: When-
ever a BE transmission is to be made to a set A, instead of encrypting directly
for A, we first partition A into two subsets A1 and A2 and encrypt for both
separately (we make the choice of the partition clear later). The revocation
security of this simple variant is based on the broadcast confidentiality of the
underlying BE scheme.
We design the tracing algorithm as follows: it interacts with the pirate
decoder and queries some form of special ciphertexts (that we call tracing
ciphertexts); based on the responses we get from the pirate decoder we infer
some partial information on the traitor keys available to the pirate decoder.
The tracing ciphertexts will simply look like the regular transmissions (to
ensure the structural indistinguishability of the regular transmissions and the
tracing ciphertexts) with the exception that a random message is encrypted
to A2 instead of the real message. If the pirate box turns out to be successful
in decrypting such tracing ciphertext, we infer that a pirate key used to forge
that pirate box belongs to a traitor located in set A1. If on the other hand, it
does not decrypt to the correct message then we infer that a pirate key used
to forge that pirate box belongs to a traitor located in set A2. Over a sequence
of tracing transmissions for different choices of A1 and A2, the tracer collects
information on the traitor locations. Here, the fingerprinting codes come into
the scene: the tracing partition will be based on a binary fingerprinting code
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so that it is possible to locate a traitor identity after tracing ciphertexts as
many as the length of the code.
In this direction, the center sets up an (ℓ, n, 2)-fingerprinting code C =
{c1, . . . , cn} for the tracing purposes: the code defines the sets Sj = {i : ci[j] =
1}, for bit positions j = 1, . . . , ℓ. As part of the tracing process, the pirate
decoder will be given a pair of BE encryptions, for each j ∈ [ℓ] intended for
sets S ∩ Sj and S \ Sj where the latter set of receivers are actually given a
random message. If the pirate box decrypts to the actual message, we infer
that the pirate key used to forge that pirate box has a 1 (resp. 0) in that
position, i.e. a traitor is contained in set Sj (resp. [n] \ Sj). We construct
a pirate codeword by marking 1 (resp. 0) in the j-th position of a codeword
of length ℓ. When we go through all bit positions, we end up with a pirate
codeword of length ℓ. That codeword will enable us to identify a traitor by
calling the identifying algorithm of the fingerprinting code.
We next comment on the choice of the partition in the regular transmission.
A trivial attempt would be splitting the subset A into two according to the
same fingerprinting code that we use in tracing. This will ensure the structural
indistinguishability of the regular transmission from the tracing transmission
(preparing a random encryption for the subset A2 is a controlled deviation
from the indistinguishability as the response of the decoder will provide the
tracer an information on the traitor identities). The downside of this approach
is that it requires the generated fingerprinting code to be part of the public
key. However, the efficient binary fingerprinting codes are mostly secret codes,
i.e. the generated code should not be published: as a result we can not employ
them in the public-key broadcast encryption schemes.
Our solution is to prepare the regular transmission through a a sampling
algorithm that simulates the code and partitions the set of enabled receivers
in such a way that is indistinguishable from the partition based on the finger-
printing code that will be used for the tracing purpose. Towards this quest,
we define, for the first time, the concept of the public samplability of a finger-
printing code and we next argue, later in the section, that the two well- known
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and studied fingerprinting codes (Tardos code [64] and Boneh-Shaw code [63])
are both publicly samplable. We formally define:
Definition Let F = ( CodeGen, Identify ) be a binary fingerprinting code.
We consider a sampling algorithm Z that, on input n and some auxiliary
information aux, samples a distribution for subset U ⊆ [n].
We say F is publicly samplable by Z(1n, aux) with ǫ probability of failure,
if the distribution for S is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution
of
S∗ = {i ∈ [n] : ci[j] = 1}
with probability at least 1 − ǫ where S∗ is defined over the choice of (i) an
(ℓ, n, 2) code C = {c1, . . . , cn} generated by CodeGen(1n) and (ii) the column-
index j ∈ [ℓ].
Below, we explain how our system works in more detail: we formally de-
scribe our construction in Section 5.5.1 provide examples of publicly samplable
fingerprinting codes in Section 5.5.2. The subsequent subsections discusses the
security issues of the construction.
5.5.1 Formal description of the generic construction
We suppose that we have our broadcast system in the form of a key en-
capsulation mechanism as defined in Section 5.3.1.2. So let B be a BE
scheme consisting of three algorithms BKeyDist(1n), BEncrypt(PKB, S), and
BDecrypt(PKB, ski, hdr) and suppose that it is secure in the sense given in
Section 5.3.1.2. Also suppose that we have a symmetric encryption scheme
Sym = (SymEncK(m),SymDecK(c)).
In the literature, a pirate decoder with σ = 1 probability is called perfect
decoder as it correctly decrypts all well-formed ciphertexts. In reality, the pi-
rate may be content with a decoder that works only a fraction of time that is
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formulated in our definition as σ-pirate with σ < 1. Such decoders are called
imperfect decoders in the work of [36] and require δ-robust binary fingerprint-
ing codes to be employed as part of the tracing process. For the simplicity of
the presentation, we first construct our T&R system T for σ = 1 case and later
discuss traceability of imperfect decoders in Section 5.5.4:
• TRKeyDist(1n) The key distribution algorithm TRKeyDist(1n) of T runs
the key distribution algorithm BKeyDist(1n) of B.
This will produce a public key PKB and a set of private keys ski, i ∈ [n],
which will be distributed to the receivers. It chooses description of a
binary fingerprinting code F = (CodeGen, Identify) that is publicly
samplable by Z. Here, we note that the actual codewords are not gener-
ated at this moment. Hence we do not require any tracing key while the
algorithm Z and some auxiliary information will be published as part of
the public key PKT =< 1
n, PKB, Z, aux >.
• Transmit(PKT, S) The algorithm first choses a random key K to
be transmitted and a subset U ⊆ [n] is sampled by the algorithm
Z(1n, aux). It sets S1 = U ∩ S and S2 = S \ (S ∩ U) that partitions S
into two (i.e., S = S1∪S2 and S1∩S2 = ∅). The transmission algorithm
then runs the encryption algorithm of the BE scheme for both subsets
and broadcasts the message c = (c1||c2) which is obtained as
(hdr1, K1)← BEncrypt(PKB, S1), (hdr2, K2)← BEncrypt(PKB, S2)
c1 ← hdr1||SymEncK1(K), c2 ← hdr2||SymEncK2(K)
• Receive(PKT, ski, c) The i-th user parses the public key PKB from PKT
and extracts hdr1||e1 and hdr2||e2 from (c = c1||c2). Then it uses the
decryption function of B to decrypt hdr1 and hdr2 and retrieves
K∗1 = BDecrypt(PKB, ski, hdr1)
K∗2 = BDecrypt(PKB, ski, hdr2)
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K∗1 and K
∗
2 will be used to decrypt to the ciphertexts e1 and e2 respec-
tively. The resulting pair will be the output of the Receive algorithm.
• Trace(S,D1S, PKT, TK) As part of the tracing process we will query
the pirate decoder D1S (in this section we consider perfect decoders with
σ = 1 only, Section 5.5.4 deals with imperfect decoders ) with specially
designed tracing ciphertexts for a randomly chosen message K (from
the key-space compatible with the KEM-DEM design) and observe the
responses of the pirate decoder. The tracing ciphertexts are different
from regular ciphertexts in two ways: (i) Instead of using the partition
based on the sampler Z(1n, aux), we generate a binary code of length
ℓ by running F .CodeGen(1n) and use the partition based on the j-th
column(we will do this for every j ∈ [ℓ]) of the generated code (ii) Rather
than encrypting the message K for both subsets in the partition, we
encrypt a random message to one of them.
More specifically, the sets Sj,1 and Sj,2 for the partition are chosen based
on the j-th column of the binary code generated. The sub-ciphertext
for the set Sj,1 decrypts to the actual message K and the sub-ciphertext
for the set Sj,2 decrypts to the random message. The tracing algorithm
forms a pirate codeword whose j-th position is recorded as 1 (which
implies the existence of a traitor in Sj,1) if the pirate decoder succeeds
to decrypt to the actual message K, and is recorded as 0 otherwise. The
F .Identify() algorithm will output a user index that is responsible for
the acts of the pirate decoder. The complete and detailed description of
the tracing procedure is given in the following algorithm 5.5.1:
Correctness: If the user possessing the private key ski is in one of the sets
S1 or S2 for which the hdr1 and hdr2 are constructed, then the keys output
by the Receive algorithm contains the key K.
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Algorithm 10 Trace(S,D1S, PKT, TK)
1: Produce {W (j)}j∈[n] ← F .CodeGen(1n).
2: Initialize a pirate codeword w ← 0ℓ
3: Parse PKB from PKT
4: for j ← 1 to ℓ do
5: Sj = {i : W (i)[j] = 1}
6: Sj,1 ← S ∩ Sj
7: Sj,2 ← S \ Sj
8: (hdr1, K1)←BEncrypt(PKB, Sj,1)
9: (hdr2, K2)←BEncrypt(PKB, Sj,2)
10: Sample K and R from the message space.
11: c1 ← hdr1||SymEncK1(K)
12: c2 ← hdr2||SymEncK2(R)
13: c← c1||c2
14: K ′ ← D1S(c)
15: if K ′ = K then
16: wj ← 1
17: else
18: wj ← 0
19: t← F .Identify(w)
20: Accuse ut for being a traitor
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5.5.1.1 Traceability of the Construction
In order to prove the traceability of our generic construction, we have to prove
that no polynomial time attacker A that forges a perfect decoder can win the
tracing game (Game 5) with some non-negligible probability. More specifically,
we will bound the winning probability of such an attacker A by a function of
the security bounds of the underlying primitives.
Theorem 5.5.1 [Traceability of a Perfect Decoder] Consider the generic T&R
scheme T that is constructed as above by employing a BE scheme B, a sym-
metric encryption scheme SYM and an open fingerprinting code F.
Let B be KEM-IND-CCA secure with probability ǫb, and SYM be IND-CCA
secure with probability ǫs and F be an (ǫf , t)-identifier q-ary fingerprinting code
that is publicly samplable by sampler Z with failure probability ǫz in the sense
of Definition 5.5.
T is a trace and revoke scheme with success probability 1− ǫf − ℓǫ against
t-coalition 1-pirate’s if it holds that
4q(ǫs + ǫb) + 2ǫz +
1
|M | ≤ 1
where M is the message space.
Proof We consider a resettable pirate decoderD1S constructed for a subset S ∈
[n] by coalitions of at most t traitors. The tracing process can be considered as
three stages: (1) Approximating the success probability of the decoder for each
tracing ciphertext of type (j, v) ∈ [ℓ]× [q], (2) Producing the pirate codeword
w and finally (3) Identifying a traitor index.
(1) Approximation: We define µj,v as the expected number of times the
decoder succeeds in experiments of type (j, v) and ρj,v as the actual number of
successes during the approximation process where each experiment is repeated
λ times. We would like to bound the approximation difference |ρj,b − µj,b|.
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Choosing λ = 3 ln(8/ǫ)
∆2
, we claim that |ρj,b − µj,b| ≥ λ · ∆ with probability at
most ǫ/4.
Due to the allowed resettability of the decoder after each tracing query we
can consider the experiments performed by the tracer are independent. By
applying a two-tailed form of the Chernoff bound we will have:
Pr[|ρj,b − µj,b| ≥ α] ≤ 2e−
α2
3µj,b ≤ 2e−α
2
3λ
Substituting α = λ ·∆ and λ = 3 ln(8/ǫ)
∆2
we obtain:
2e−α
2/3λ = 2e−
λ2∆2
3λ ≤ 2e−∆2λ/3
≤ 2e− ln(8/ǫ) ≤ ǫ/4
The above analysis conclude the fact that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and v ∈
{1, . . . , q}, we have |ρj,v − µj,v| ≤ λ ·∆ with probability at least 1− ǫ/4. This
fact is equivalent of saying |pj,v − σj,v| ≤ ∆ with probability at least 1 − ǫ/4
for which µj,v = λ · σj,v and ρj,v = λ · pj,v holds.
(2) Pirate Codeword Generation: The tracer sets wj = s for the smallest
s ∈ [q] that satisfies |ρj,s−1 − ρj,s| ≥ λθ and we choose θ to be equal to
1−2ǫz−1/|M |
q
.
We next argue that the pirate codeword w is in the descendant set of
the traitor coalition T . This is equivalent of claiming that if wj = s then
Sj,s ∩ T 6= ∅ holds for j = 1, . . . , ℓ.
By applying the triangular inequality for the equations |µj,s−1 − ρj,s−1| ≤
λ ·∆ and |µj,s − ρj,s| ≤ λ ·∆, we obtain:
|µj,s−1 − µj,s| ≥ |ρj,s−1 − ρj,s| − 2λ∆
with probability at least (1− ǫ/4)2 ≥ 1− ǫ/2.
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It follows that if the tracer returns the value s, i.e., |ρj,s−1 − ρj,s| ≥
λ(1−2ǫz−1/|M |)
q
for the choice of ∆ = 1−2ǫz−1/|M |
4q
, it will happen with proba-
bility at least 1− ǫ/2 that
|µj,s−1 − µj,s| ≥ λ(1−2ǫz−1/|M |)q − 2λ(1−2ǫz−1/|M |)4q
|pj,s−1 − pj,s| ≥ 1−2ǫz−1/|M |2q
The above suggest that if a value s ∈ [q] is returned by the tracer, it holds
that the probability difference |pj,s−1− pj,s| exceeds the threshold of 2(ǫs+ ǫb)
with probability at least 1−ǫ/2, as we know from the statement of the theorem
that 4q(ǫs + ǫb) + 2ǫz +
1
|M |
≤ 1. In such case, we claim that Sj,s ∩ T 6= ∅. We
proceed with proof by contradiction, i.e. assume the converse of the statement
|pj,s−1−pj,s| > 2(ǫs+ǫb) and there exists no traitor in set Sj,s. This contradicts
with the security claims of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme SYM
and broadcast encryption scheme B. Indeed, if there is no traitor in set Sj,s, the
pirate decoder can distinguish between the tracing ciphertext of type (j, s−1)
and of type (j, s) by only breaking the underlying encryption schemes. Hence,
the distinguishing probability is bounded by 2(ǫs + ǫb).
On the other hand, we claim that pj,0 ≥ 1− 2ǫz: this is because a tracing
ciphertexts of type (j, 0) for j = 1, . . . , ℓ is different from a regular transmission
in the way partition of the subset S is chosen. Recall that F is an (ǫf , t)-
identifier fingerprinting code that is publicly samplable by sampler Z with
failure probability ǫz in the sense of Definition 5.5. Hence, the pirate decoder
D1S would decrypt the tracing ciphertexts of type (j, 0), for all j ∈ [ℓ], with
probability at least 1− 2ǫz. Otherwise, the decoder can be used to distinguish
the way sampler and the fingerprinting code works.
We also know that pj,q ≤ 1|M | since a tracing ciphertext of type (j, q) to-
tally hides the information on the message transmitted. Hence the triangu-
lar inequality implies that there exists at least one 0 < v ≤ n such that
|pv−1 − pv| ≥ (1− 2ǫz − 1/|M |)/q. With an identical argumentation as above
we show that when the tracer reaches the v-th interval it will output v with
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probability 1−ǫ/2. This suggests that the tracer will indeed output a user and
not reach the end of all experiments without discovering any candidate cor-
rupted user. Combining the above two results we conclude the pirate codeword
generation phase with success probability 1− ǫ.
(3) Traitor Identification We argue above that the pirate codeword is in
the descendant set of the traitor coalition. In our application of fingerprinting
code, the partition in a tracing transmission does not hide the user codewords,
i.e. the code is open to the adversary. Hence, Identify(w) returns a traitor
index with probability at least 1− ǫf as long as the fingerprinting code is open
(not secret as in the cases of Tardos or Boneh-Shaw codes). This completes
the proof of the traceability. The overall failure probability of accusing an
innocent user is bounded by ǫf + ℓǫ (for the failures in identification, and in
approximations, respectively) for the given parameters.
5.5.2 Samplable Fingerprinting Codes
As we argued above, the traceability of our generic construction relies on the
existence of publicly samplable open fingerprinting code. Fortunately, the
Chor-Fiat-Naor fingerprinting code [32] is such a code.
Theorem 5.5.2 There exists a sampling algorithm ZCFN with auxiliary infor-
mation w (the size of the traitor coalition) such that Chor-Fiat-Naor finger-
printing code resistant against a traitor coalition of size w is publicly samplable
by ZCFN in the sense of Definition 5.5. The sampler ZT requires computation
time linear in number of codewords.
Proof Due to lack of space, we omit the description of Chor-Fiat-Naor code
here. Very briefly, it generates a code C = {c1, . . . , cn} ⊂ Qℓ randomly over
an alphabet Q of size q = 2w2: more specifically, for all choices of i ∈ [n] and
j ∈ [ℓ], we set ci[j] = k with probability 1/q for any k ∈ Q. If the length
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of the code is 4w2 log n/ǫ, then the code becomes a w-traceability code with
probability 1− ǫ, hence becomes resistant against a traitor coalition of size w.
Z(1n, w) will follow the same randomized method to construct a partition
V = {V1, . . . , Vq}: for each i ∈ [n], randomly selects an element from the
alphabet Q, say k ∈ Q and places i in set Vk. The proof of the theorem is
now straight-forward as the columns of the generated code are independently
sampled and the sampler Z constructs the partition in exact same way. Note
also, the computation time of the sampler is linear in number of codewords n.
5.5.3 Broadcast Confidentiality
We next prove the security of our construction regarding the confidentiality of
the broadcast messages.
Theorem 5.5.3 (Confidentiality) Let T be a trace and revoke scheme that
is constructed through our generic transformation from a BE scheme B, a sym-
metric encryption scheme S and a q-ary fingerprinting code. T would satisfy
the KEM-IND-CCA security for any polynomial time attacker AT such that
AdvAT ≤ 2q · ǫb + 2q · ǫs
holds where B is ǫb-secure in the KEM-IND-CCA model and S is ǫs-secure in
the IND-CPA model. It further holds that if the underlying scheme B supports
adaptive security then so does the scheme T.
Proof We will use a game hopping approach to prove the theorem: we will
start with the basic confidentiality game for trace and revoke scheme. We
next modify the basic game gradually to reach a final game which provides
the adversary no advantage. This is a standard proof technique that bounds
the advantage of the adversary in the original game by the differences in the
subsequent games.
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Figure 5.1: Game G0: the actual KEM-IND-CCA game.
Let G0 be the KEM-IND-CCA message confidentiality game for trace and
revoke schemes. We had passed over the full description of the game in Section
6.1.3 with a quick reference to the Game 1. The details of this game is depicted
in Figure 6.3. We denote an arbitrary adversary playing the game G0 against
the challenger CT of the trace and revoke scheme by AT . In the figure, we
considered a static attack model where the adversary commits to the set S∗
it wants to attack. The challenger publishes the public key afterwards. In
contrast, it is also possible that the adversary commits to the set S∗ after it
observes the public key. The latter, denoted by adaptive attack, is a stronger
attack model as the public key may let the adversary have some non-trivial
information that is useful for the choice of the target set. The order of the
commitment of the target set and the publication of the public key will not
affect the validity of our proof arguments below. The choice of the order
is propagated in our transformation smoothly. Hence we will consider the
security for static attack model, the adaptive case follows in a similar way.
We proceed with description of the subsequent games. Let Wj denote the
event that the adversary AT wins the j-th game Gj:
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Game 0: The first game, depicted in Figure 6.3 is identical to the KEM
security game for trace and revoke schemes. Thus,
|Pr[W0]− 1
2
| = AdvAT
In this game, the challenger prepares a valid ciphertext. The partition
{S∗i }i∈[q] is chosen based on the sampler Z and constructs the headers
(hdr∗i , K
∗
i )← BEnc(PKB, S∗i ), e∗i ← SEncK∗i (k0)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q where k0 and k1 are randomly chosen keys compatible
with the symmetric encryption algorithm SEnc. Along with the full headers
〈S∗i , hdr∗i , e∗i 〉i∈[q], the challenger transmits kb for a randomly selected bit b. We
say the adversary wins the game if it guesses b correctly.
Game 1 through Game q: This sequence of games is identical to the first
Game G0 except the way the challenger prepares the encryption for e
∗
· . In
Game Gj, the encryption e
∗
i for i ≤ j is made under a randomly chosen key
K+i instead of K
∗
i :
e∗i ← SEncK+i (k0)
Such modification breaks the relation between the header hdr∗i and e
∗
i . We next
claim that there exists a broadcast encryption adversary AB whose running
time is about the same as AT such that:
|Pr[Wj−1]− Pr[Wj]| = 2AdvAB
holds for j = 1, . . . , q. We next argue the construction of the adversary AB,
depicted in Figure 6.4 which intends to break the KEM-IND-CCA security of
the broadcast encryption B. The adversary AB will simulate the challenger CT
of the trace and revoke security game. The simulator will embed the chal-
lenge it receives from the broadcast challenger CB to the challenge requested
by the adversary AT . After receiving the set S
∗, the simulator will create
the partition S∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S∗q} immediately and forwards the j-th subset to
the broadcast encryption challenger CB. This is a crucial step to be able to
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Figure 5.2: Constructing a broadcast encryption adversary AB that simulates
the challenger of the trace and revoke adversary AT . Its advantage is reduced
to the AT ’s ability of distinguishing its views among games Gj−1 and Gj.
simulate the secret keys of the scheme T whose keys are basically the keys
of the underlying broadcast encryption scheme. The simulator will be able
to respond the decryption queries k, 〈S∗i , hdr∗i , e∗i 〉i∈[q] of the adversary AT as
long as the secret key of the intended user k is available to the adversary AB.
Otherwise, the adversary forwards the decryption query k, 〈S∗j , hdr∗j 〉 to the
challenger CB and retrieves the key to decrypt the symmetric encryption e
∗
i .
After requesting the challenge from AT , the adversary AB simulates the
challenger CT as follows: All the headers 〈S∗i , hdr∗i , e∗i 〉 for i 6= j will be pre-
pared as in the Game Gj−1. The challenge received from CB will base the
j − th header of the trace and revoke challenge. Upon receiving (hdr∗, K+)
from the challenger CB we set hdr
∗
j = hdr
∗ and e∗j = SEncK+(k0)
Observe, now, that if the challenge of CB is a valid broadcast ciphertext
(this corresponds to the case d = 0 in Figure 6.4), the adversary AT plays in
Game Gj−1. In contrast, AT plays in Game Gj if the challenge is not valid
(d = 1 in Figure 6.4).
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Let us compute the winning probability of AB: (i) if d = 0 AB wins the
game if AT wins the game, hence bounded by Pr[Wj−1]; (ii) if d = 1 AB wins
the game if AT loses the game, hence bounded by 1−Pr[Wj ]. This completes
our claim that |Pr[Wj−1] − Pr[Wj]| = 2AdvAB which is then upper-bounded
by 2ǫb
At this point, we have reached to game Gq where all BE keys K
∗
i are
distorted. We continue with q more games gradually replacing the key k0 with
k+i ’s.
Game q+1 through Game 2q: This sequence of games is identical to the
Game Gq except the way the challenger prepares the encryption for e
∗
· . In
Game Gq+j, we set:
e∗i ← SEncK+i (k
+
i )
for i ≤ j where k+i ’s are randomly chosen. Such modification in Game Gq+j
hides totally the information of kb in the first j headers. We next claim that
there exists a symmetric encryption adversary AS whose running time is about
the same as AT such that:
|Pr[Wq+j−1]− Pr[Wq+j ]| = 2AdvAS
holds for j = 1, . . . , q. We construct the adversary AS in a similar way we
have constructed the adversary AB. We omit the details of the simulation
due to simplicity and similarity. Hence the probability differences above are
upper-bounded by 2ǫs.
Note that the last game G2q gives absolutely no information about kb thus
the probability Pr[W2q] of the adversary winning the game G2q is
1
2
. Applying
the triangular inequalities over the probability differences above we obtain:
2q · ǫb + 2q · ǫs ≥
∑2q
i=1 |Pr[Wi]− Pr[Wi−1]|
≥ |Pr[W2q]− Pr[W0]|
≥ |1
2
− Pr[W0]|
≥ AdvAT
which completes the security proof of our generic transformation.
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Remark. In the definitions of the games, the order of attacker’s choice of
target set and receiving the public key can be changed. This does not affect the
validity of the above argument neither. Therefore, if the primitive broadcast
encryption scheme satisfies adaptive security rather than static, then so does
the resulting trace and revoke scheme generated by our construction.
5.5.4 Tracing Imperfect Decoders
We proved the traceability of our generic construction against a perfect decoder
in Section 5.5.1. However, as discussed in [36], any scheme whose traceability
is due to a fingerprinting code can fail to identify a traitor key if the decoder
chooses not to decrypt some transmissions. Such decoder is called an imperfect
decoder and its behavior may lead to some gaps in producing a pirate codeword
which will result to a failure in identification algorithm. The solution against
such behavior is to use a δ-robust fingerprinting code to transform the tracing
capability of a scheme to apply to imperfect decoders. An analysis of such a
transformation is provided in [36]. We can apply the same transformation in
a similar way to our case to obtain traceability against imperfect decoders.
We detail this transformation in this section to give a complete analysis: we
consider an imperfect decoder DσS that is (σ, S)-pirate where 0 < σ < 1. The
imperfect decoder will be queried with the same type of tracing ciphertexts of
Section 5.5.1.
Let us recall the notation: we say the tracing ciphertext to be of type
(j, 0) if the partition is based on the j-th column of the fingerprinting code. If
Sj,1, Sj,2 are the subsets partitioning the set S for the j-th column of the code,
then the tracing ciphertext of type (j, 0) will be concatenation of c ← c1||c2
where:
(hdr1, K1)← BEncrypt(PK, Sj,1), c1 ← hdr1||SymEncK1(K)
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(hdr2, K2)← BEncrypt(PK, Sj,2), c2 ← hdr2||SymEncK2(K)
The above tracing ciphertext of type (j, 0) is a well-formed ciphertext with
a small modification: Instead of using the partition based on the sampler
Z(1n, aux), we generate a binary code of length ℓ by running F .CodeGen(1n)
and use the partition based on the j-th column(we will do this for every j ∈ [ℓ])
of the generated code. We call the tracing ciphertext to be of type (j, 1) if c2
is constructed to encrypt a random message R in replace of K:
(hdr1, K1)← BEncrypt(PK, Sj,1), c1 ← hdr1||SymEncK1(K)
(hdr2, K2)← BEncrypt(PK, Sj,2), c2 ← hdr2||SymEncK2(R)
The tracing algorithm of Section 5.5.1, by only querying the ciphertexts
of type (j, 1) will not succeed against imperfect decoder: indeed, we can not
simply infer that a traitor exists in Sj2 if the decoder does not decrypt the
tracing ciphertext of type j. This is because the decoder is imperfect, i.e.
works with σ probability, and may choose not to decrypt for such partition
of (Sj1 , Sj2). More generally speaking, the success probability of decrypting a
tracing ciphertext of type (j, 0) is not guaranteed to be related in a predictable
manner to the overall success probability σ.
To overcome the above issues, we will, first, approximate the success
probabilities of the decoder in decrypting tracing transmissions of each type.
We next construct the pirate codeword based on the values of the approxi-
mated success probabilities. The complete tracing process is shown in Algo-
rithm 5.5.4.
Let us discuss a quick overview of the tracing process of Algorithm 5.5.4.
It has 3 stages: (i) Approximation, (ii) Pirate Codeword Generation and (iii)
Traitor identification.
(i) As part of the approximation, we compute the success probability of
the σ-pirate decoder in decrypting tracing ciphertexts of both types (j, 0)
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Algorithm 11 Trace(S,DσS, PK, TK) with parameters 1 > ǫ,∆, ǫ′ > 0
1: Produce {W (j)}j∈[n] ← F .CodeGen(1n).
2: Set λ = 3 ln (2/ǫ)
∆2
.
3: Initialize a pirate codeword w ← 0ℓ
//Approximation of the success probabilities
4: for j ← 1 to ℓ do
5: Sj = {i : W (i)[j] = 1}
6: Sj,1 ← S ∩ Sj
7: Sj,2 ← S \ (S ∩ Sj)
8: Approximate the success probability for tracing ciphertexts of type (j, 0)
qj = App(DσS, λ, Sj,1, Sj,2, 0) (Run the Algorithm 5.5.4)
9: Approximate the success probability for tracing ciphertexts of type (j, 1)
pj = App(DσS, λ, Sj,1, Sj,2, 1) (Run the Algorithm 5.5.4)
//Pirate Codeword Generation
10: for j ← 1 to ℓ do
11: if pj > 2ǫ
′ +∆ then
12: wj ← 1 // a traitor in subset Sj,2
13: else
14: if qj > 3ǫ
′ + 3∆ then
15: wj ← 0 // a traitor in subset Sj,1
16: else
17: wj ←? // decoder does not respond
// Traitor Identification
18: k ← F .Identify(w)
19: Accuse uk for being a traitor
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and (j, 1). Let us denote qj and pj respectively be the approximations. The
Algorithm 5.5.4 is employed in this stage of the tracing process which basically
queries the decoder with λ number of ciphertexts and returns the rate of
the decryption success. Here, λ, as a function of the parameters ǫ,∆ > 0,
will affect the accuracy of the approximation. More specifically, we say our
approximation is ∆-close if the distance of the approximated rate from the
actual success probability is less than ∆ and ǫ is the probability of failure in
having a ∆-close approximation.
Algorithm 12 Approximate the success probability of an imperfect decoder
App(D, λ, Sj,1, Sj,2, b)
1: ρ← 0
2: for k ← 1 to λ do
3: (hdr1, K1)←BEncrypt(PK, Sj,1)
4: (hdr2, K2)←BEncrypt(PK, Sj,2)
5: Sample K and R from the message space.
6: c1 ← hdr1||SymEncK1(K)
// We create a tracing ciphertext of type (j, 1) if b = 1
7: if b = 1 then
8: set c2 ← hdr2||SymEncK2(R)
// We create a tracing ciphertext of type (j, 0) otherwise
9: else
10: set c2 ← hdr2||SymEncK2(K)
11: c← c1||c2
12: K ′ ← D(c)
13: if K ′ = K then
14: ρ← ρ+ 1
15: Reset the decoder.
16: return ρ/λ
(ii) Pirate Codeword Generation: based on the approximated values pj and
qj we will generate the pirate codeword. The analysis relies on the following
observation: the set of receivers in set Sj,1 = S∩Sj = S∩{i : W (i)[j] = 1} will
be able to retrieve the message in a transmission given in the experiment of
type (j, 1) while the receivers in the set Sj,2 = S \ (S ∩ Sj) (i.e. Sj,2 = S ∩ {i :
W (i)[j] = 0} ) will fail to decrypt. If the decoder succeeds in decrypting
tracing ciphertexts of type (j, 1) we conclude that a traitor exists in set Sj,1.
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This can be formally justified by checking if the approximated value pj is
high enough. More specifically, we check if pj is at least 2ǫ
′ + ∆ where ǫ′ is
the probability of breaking the underlying encryption schemes BEncrypt and
SymEnc. In this case we set wj = 1.
On the other hand, assume that there is an upper bound on the value of pj.
We, then, check how different the decoder behaves between the types of tracing
ciphertexts. If the difference of qj − pj is high enough then we conclude that
the decoder distinguishes the tracing ciphertexts of type (j, 0) from type (j, 1);
hence a traitor exists in set Sj,2. Since pj is already assumed to be bounded
by above, we check for a lower bound on qj such that the distinguishability
of the tracing ciphertext types will lead a break to the underlying encryption
schemes BEncrypt and SymEnc. More specifically, if qj is at least 3ǫ
′+3∆ then
we set wj = 0. In any other case, i.e. both qj and pj are bounded from above,
the decoder does not reveal enough information. Hence we can not make a
decision and set wj =?.
(iii) Traitor Identification: End of the previous stage we obtain a pirate
codeword w = w1, . . . , wℓ. We finally run the identification algorithm on input
w which returns an index k from the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. The k-th receiver is
accused of being a traitor. The overall failure probability is bounded by ǫf+ℓǫ
(for the failure in identification and the failure in approximation respectively).
Now, we state a theorem that asserts a tracing ability for our scheme
assuming primitive BE and symmetric encryption schemes satisfying certain
security definitions and a fingerprint coding scheme with a certain identifying
ability.
Theorem 5.5.4 [Traceability of Imperfect Decoders] Consider the generic
trace and revoke scheme T that is constructed in Section 5.5 by employing
a broadcast encryption scheme B, a symmetric encryption scheme SYM and a
fingerprinting code F.
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Let B be KEM-IND-CCA secure with probability ǫb in the sense of Defi-
nition 5.3.1.2, and SYM be IND-CCA secure with probability ǫs in the regular
sense and F be a δ-robust (ǫf , t)-identifier fingerprinting code that is publicly
samplable by sampler Z() with ǫz probability of failure in the sense of defini-
tion 5.5.
T is a trace and revoke scheme with success probability 1−ǫf−ℓ(ǫs+ǫb+ǫz)
against t-coalition σ-pirates if we run the Algorithm 5.5.4 as a tracing process
with parameters ǫ′ = ǫs+ ǫb, ∆ and ǫ for the choice of δ =
1−σ
1−γ
where σ > γ =
3(ǫs + ǫb) + 4∆ holds.
Proof We consider a σ-pirate decoder DσS constructed for a subset S ∈ [n] by
coalitions of at most t traitors. The tracing process of Algorithm 5.5.4 can be
considered as three stages: (1) Approximating the success probability of the
decoder for each type (j, b) ∈ [ℓ] × {0, 1}, (2) Producing the pirate codeword
w and finally (3) Identifying a traitor index.
(1) Approximation: We define µj,b as the expected number of times the
decoder succeeds in experiment of type (j, b) and ρj,b as the actual number
of successes during the approximation process (each experiment is repeated
λ times). We would like to bound the approximation difference |ρj,b − µj,b|.
Choosing λ = 3 ln(2/ǫ)
∆2
, we claim that |ρj,b − µj,b| ≥ λ · ∆ with probability at
most ǫ.
Due to the allowed resettability of the decoder after each tracing query we
can consider the experiments performed by the tracer are independent. By
applying a two-tailed form of the Chernoff bound we will have:
Pro[|ρj,b − µj,b| ≥ α] ≤ 2e−
α2
3µj,b ≤ 2e−α
2
3λ
Substituting α = λ ·∆ and λ = 3 ln(2/ǫ)
∆2
we obtain:
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2e−α
2/3λ = 2e−
λ2∆2
3λ
≤ 2e−∆2λ/3
≤ 2e− ln(2/ǫ)
≤ ǫ
The above analysis conclude the fact that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and b ∈
{0, 1}, we have |ρj,b − µj,b| ≤ λ · ∆ with probability at least 1 − ǫ. Denoting
the actual success probability of the decoder in an experiment of type (j, b) by
σj,b we conclude that |pj − σj,1| ≤ ∆ and |qj − σj,0| ≤ ∆ hold with probability
at least 1− ǫ.
(2) Pirate Codeword Generation: We next argue whether the codeword w
is in the descendant set of the traitor coalition, i.e. the constructed pirate
codeword, indeed, is formed by the actual coalition of traitors.
Our argument is based on the following observation: the set of receivers in
set Sj,1 = S ∩Sj = S ∩ {i : CW (i)[j] = 1} will be able to retrieve the message
in a transmission given in the experiment of type (j, 1) while the receivers in
the set Sj,2 = S \ (S ∩ Sj) (i.e. Sj,2 = S ∩ {i : CW (i)[j] = 0} ) will fail
to decrypt. If the approximated success probability pj is high enough (will
be made clearer below), then we claim the existence of a traitor in set Sj,1.
Otherwise, we check the difference of qj − pj, i.e. checking a lower bound for
qj as pj is already bounded by above: if the difference is substantially high
(again will be made clearer below) then we conclude that there is a traitor in
set Sj,2 that can differentiate the experiment performed. In any other case, we
can not make a choice, hence we put ?.
We next make an analysis of our argument summarized above:
First Case (i): If pj > 2(ǫs+ ǫb)+∆, we claim that there exists a traitor in
the set Sj,1. Considering the accuracy of approximation we obtain σj,1 > 2(ǫs+
ǫb). We, then, proceed with proof by contradiction: Assume that the traitor
coalition set T satisfies (T ∩ S) ⊂ Sj,2. Hence, the ciphertexts transmitted in
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an experiment of type (j, 1) are hiding the plaintext that is needed to return
in order for the experiment to succeed with a failure probability of 2(ǫs + ǫb)
due to the semantic security of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme
(E, D) and broadcast encryption scheme BE. It concludes that the pirate decoder
can win the experiment of type (j, 1) with probability at most 2(ǫs + ǫb), i.e.
pj ≤ 2(ǫs + ǫb) + ∆ which contradicts with the current-condition on pj. We
set wj = 1 in this case.
Second Case (ii): If pj < 2(ǫs + ǫb) + ∆ and qj > 3(ǫs + ǫb) + 3∆, then we
claim that there exists a traitor in the set Sj,2. We again proceed with proof
by contradiction: assume that the traitor coalition set T satisfies (T ∩ S) ⊂
Sj,1. Provided that all traitors are included in set Sj,1, the pirate decoder can
distinguish between the distributions Transmit(PK, S,m) and a transmission
given in experiment of type (j) only with probability at most 2(ǫs + ǫb) due
to the semantic security of the underlying symmetric encryption scheme (E, D)
and broadcast encryption scheme BE. Hence we obtain |σj,0−σj,1| ≤ 2(ǫs+ ǫb).
Combining with the accuracy of the approximation of σj,0 and σj,1, we obtain
|qj − pj| ≤ 2(ǫs + ǫb) + 2∆. Apparently, this contradicts with the current
conditions on qj and pj. We set wj = 0 in this case.
Third Case (iii): If pj < 2(ǫs + ǫb) + ∆ and qj < 3(ǫs + ǫb) + 3∆, this
corresponds to the case that the pirate decoder denies responding, hence we
can not get enough information. We set wj =?.
(3) Traitor Identification The pirate codeword constructed above contains
a fraction of ?’s that is chosen for columns with qj < 3(ǫs + ǫb) + 3∆. Due to
the approximation, with probability 1− ǫ, it holds that σj,0 < 3(ǫs+ ǫb) + 4∆.
For simplicity of the notation let us say 3(ǫs + ǫb) + 4∆ = γ Now, if δ is the
fraction of columns where σj,0 < γ then the decoder’s error rate (that is 1−σ)
is at least δ(1− γ). Solving for δ we obtain δ < 1−σ
1−γ
which is satisfied due to
the given bounds for σ. (given that σ > γ as part of the theorem statement,
we also ensure that δ < 1 holds.)
As the pirate codeword is in the descendant set of the traitor coalition
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with a fraction of at most δ ?’s, the Identify(w) returns a traitor index with
probability at least 1− ǫf .
This completes the proof of the traceability. The overall failure proba-
bility of accusing an innocent user is bounded by ǫf + ℓǫ (for the failures in
identification, and in approximation, respectively) for the given parameters.
5.6 Comparison with Existing T&R Schemes
In this section, we will discuss the performance of the resulting T&R schemes
that emerges when we use some of the popular BE schemes in the literature
with our construction technique.
5.6.1 Our Instantiations
We instantiate our generic construction with the open fingerprinting code of
Chor-Fiar-Naor in [32] and the following three broadcast encryption schemes.
The efficiency characteristics of the below instantiations are compared to the
existing trace and revoke schemes in the introduction(see Table 5.2)
BGW1: One seminal work on public key BE is the scheme of Boneh, Gentry,
and Waters [21]. In the basic scheme given in this chapter, which we will
denote with BGW1, the public key consists of O(n) group elements whereas
private keys and ciphertexts are of size O(1). The encryption algorithm of
this scheme is dominated by O(p) group operations needed, where p is the size
of the privileged user set. However, with a caching technique, this complexity
can be reduced to O(min (p, r)) where r is the size of the revoked user set.
The decryption process consists of O(1) pairing calculations, and O(p) group
operations which again can be reduced to O(min (p, r)).
108
When we instantiate our generic T&R construction with this scheme, pub-
lic and private key sizes are unchanged (i.e., O(n) and O(1), respectively) and
the ciphertext size is only doubled and hence is O(1). Encryption and decryp-
tion complexities become O(p), instead of O(min (p, r)) since we partition the
privileged set and the caching technique will no longer be effective.
BGW2: The general scheme of [21], which we will denote with BGW2, has the
idea to use several instances of the basic scheme in parallel. Since all instances
can use the same set of public keys, with an optimal trade-off, the public key
size is reduced to O(
√
n) with the cost of increasing ciphertext size to O(
√
n)
group elements. Users still have private keys of size O(1).
As far as the encryption and decryption algorithms are concerned, compu-
tation cost is reduced to O(
√
n + min (p, r)) since for each of the
√
n parts,
another miniature basic scheme instance is run each having r′ revoked users.
O(
√
n) comes from the fact that calculations must be done for each instance,
and O(min (p, r)) comes from the total number of calculations in all these
instances using the caching idea. For details we refer the reader to [21].
When we instantiate our generic T&R construction with BGW2, public and
private key sizes are unchanged. Ciphertext size is only doubled, therefore it
remains O(
√
n).
In the complexities of the encryption and decryption algorithms, a simi-
lar performance drop takes place as in BGW1 again because of the fact that
caching technique becomes ineffective due to partitioning. So, encryption has
a complexity of O(
√
n+ p). In the decryption process, receivers make calcula-
tions only within their instance, therefore the complexity becomes O(
√
n+ p′)
where p′ is the number of privileged users within the instance of the decrypt-
ing receiver. Since p′ ≤ √n, we can say that the complexity of decryption is
O(
√
n).
Del: For the ID-based setting, we consider the BE schemes of Delerable´e
[65] and the virtually identical scheme of Sakai and Furukawa [72]. This scheme
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is dynamic in the sense that the total number of users is not fixed in the setup
and any new user can decrypt all previously distributed messages. Another
property of it is that it puts a bound m for the number of receivers per trans-
mission, and the public key size is linear in this number instead of the number
of all users as in public key BE schemes we mentioned above.
In this scheme, the public key is of size O(m) where m is the maximum
number of receivers per transmissions. Private keys of users consist of single
group elements hence private keys are of size O(1). Ciphertexts consist of two
group elements which means it is also O(1). One may assume that m = n or
m =
√
n, where n is considered to be the initial number of users in the system.
We call the special case m = n as Del1. In case m < n, several encryptions
are done ⌈n/m⌉ times. i.e., ciphertext becomes O(√n) when m = √n. We
call this case as Del2.
Using our construction with the scheme of [65] leads to the following result.
Keys do not change, therefore key sizes remain the same: O(m) = O(
√
n)
public key and O(1) private keys per users. Ciphertext is only doubled, hence
it remains O(1) since it is four group elements.
GW1: In [66] three different schemes with different properties are given. One
is a standard BE scheme (not ID-based) which we will call GW1. In this scheme,
public key is of size O(m) where m is the maximum number of receivers in
a broadcast. Ciphertext and private keys are of constant size. This scheme
satisfies semi-static security, where the attacker commits to a subset of users
before seeing public keys first, and afterwards can choose any subset of it as
the final set to be attacked. Semi-static security is a sort of middle-ground
between static and adaptive security, and hence shown as supporting static
security in table 5.2. When our T&R construction is applied to GW1, only the
ciphertext size and computation complexities will double. Therefore we get a
T&R scheme with the same asymptotic performance as GW1.
GW2 and GW3: Second and third schemes we will consider from [66] are
identity based BE schemes. GW2 is an adaptively secure identity based BE
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scheme in the random oracle model. In this scheme, constant size ciphertexts
are achieved by using a hash function. GW3 does not use any hash functions but
instead uses the idea of running parallel smaller instances of the basic scheme
given in [66] and achieve O(
√
n) size ciphertexts as in Del2 above. Therefore,
public key size is O(n) and ciphertext is O(1) in GW2, whereas in GW3 both are
O(
√
n). Private keys are O(1) for both schemes.
Instantiating GW1 and GW2 with our construction leads to T&R systems
with inherited asymptotic ciphertext, public key and private key sizes, since
only ciphertexts as well as computations are doubled.
5.6.1.1 Other Schemes
We listed above only a small number of the broadcast encryption schemes
that are either well-known or are suitable for instantiations with reasonable
efficiency performance. It would be worth to note that a broadcast encryption
scheme with a ciphertext size of O(r) will result a ciphertext length of O(n)
in our generic trace and revoke scheme. A number of schemes in the litera-
ture (a non-exhaustive list would include [12, 73, 74] in both symmetric and
asymmetric settings) are of this type that are preferably in revocation-only
settings due to other parameters. Even though we do not illustrate instantia-
tions based on such schemes in Table 5.2, we note that they may serve good
in certain application domains for small n values. For instance, [73] provides
a scheme with the public and private keys as a constant number of group el-
ements from an elliptic-curve group of prime order; this can be used in our
generic construction to keep any kind of key storage (both private and public
keys especially for off-line decryption process) low in small devices like sensor
nodes.
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5.6.1.2 Remarks
The round complexity of a black-box tracing mechanism is the number of
queries asked to the decoder and it is an important efficiency parameter as
formalized in [40]. Most of the schemes in the literature (e.g. [37, 43]) leads
to a quadratic number of tracing queries in number of users regardless of the
traitor coalition. On the other hand, our generic construction, when employs a
fingerprinting code with a bound w on traitor coalition, would result in round
complexity of O(w4). Here in this paper, we applied the linear tracing strategy
to locate a subset containing a traitor. As an alternative suggested by [40],
we may have used the tracing strategy of [40] which would reduce the round
complexity to O(w2).
A further improvement over the scheme is possible if the fingerprinting
code is generated at the time of tracing for |S| many codewords instead of as
many as the number of receivers n. This is a substantial improvement over the
encryption time as it is sufficient to flip |S| coins. This improvement should be
considered for applications where the enabled set of receivers is substantially
less than the whole population.
5.6.2 Comparison
A number of trace and revoke schemes in the non-black box setting that we
do not include in comparison.
BW: A popular public key T&R scheme is given in [43], which we call BW,
where the public key, private key, and ciphertext sizes are O(
√
n). Encryption
complexity is O(
√
n + min (p, r)) and the decryption complexity is O(
√
n +
min (p′, r′)), where r′ is the number of revoked users within the instance of the
decrypting receiver. Since min (p′, r′) ≤ √n, we can say that the complexity
of decryption is O(
√
n). For details we refer the reader to [43].
A comparison of the scheme generated by our construction using BGW1 and
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BGW2 to the T&R scheme of [43] is provided in Table 5.2.
FA: In comparison to [43] a trade-off between the private-key length and
the public key length is achieved in a trace and scheme due to Furukawa and
Attrapadung [46]: this scheme has a constant private key size in exchange for
a public key of linear size in the number n of receivers. However, it is noted in
[46] that only O(log
√
n) of the public key is needed by a receiver along with its
unique private key to decrypt a broadcast. Hence, in a setting where the public
key is also stored in decryption device, there seems to be no observed problem
of having O(n) public key size in total. There is still a disadvantage of FA
related to its security proof: it is proved in the generic bilinear group model
under the subgroup decision assumption. Some weaknesses in the generic
group model has been discussed in [67] which are comparable with the ones
in the random oracle model. Hence, we can easily argue that the constant
private key size of a trace and revoke scheme in the standard model does not
exist till our results.
ADMNPS: We compare our results in the ID-based setting with a recent
trace-only scheme (to the best of our knowledge we are not aware of any id-
based trace and revoke scheme) by Abdalla et al. [35], which we will call
ADMNPS. This scheme achieves adaptive security in the standard model with a
constant private key size that is as small as a four group elements. As we have
already seen in the case of FA, this gain comes with its price: the scheme of
ADMNPS, based on a fingerprinting code, has its public key and ciphertext of
size in proportion to the length of the code. Based on fully-collusion resistant
fingerprinting code, the typical length would be of O(n2 log n
ǫ
) (ǫ is the failure
probability of tracing) which makes the scheme quite inefficient due to the
huge ciphertext and public key sizes. A full comparison in terms of usual
parameters is given in Table 5.2.
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Max Failure Pirate Tracing round
Scheme coll. prob. success(σ) complexity
T&R scheme of BW [43] n ǫ 4nǫs O(
n2 logn
σ2
log 1
ǫ
)
Our Instantiations n ǫ 4nǫs + 2δ O(
n2
δ2
log n
ǫ
log
n2 log n
ǫ
ǫ
)
Our Instantiations w ǫ 4nǫs + 2δ O(
w2
δ2
log n
ǫ
log
n2 log n
ǫ
ǫ
)
Table 5.2: The table shows the comparison of our instantiations with the
T&R scheme of [43] in terms of their tracing round complexities. We suppose
ǫ = 2ǫf = ǫ
′/2ℓ to get the entries in the case of our construction.
5.6.2.1 Comparing Round Complexities
The round complexity (i.e., the number of queries needed in tracing) of [43]
is O(n
2 log n
σ2
log 1
ǫ
) where σ is the success rate of a useful pirate decoder that
one might want to trace and ǫ is the failure probability of tracing. Our con-
struction which uses [21] and Tardos codes [64], has a round complexity of
O(n
2
δ2
log n
ǫ
log
n2 log n
ǫ
ǫ
) if we set ǫ = 2ǫf = ǫ
′/2ℓ where ǫf is the failure prob-
ability of the fingerprinting code in identifying the pirate codeword and ǫ′ is
a special security parameter of the tracing algorithm that corresponds to the
failure probability of deciding a wrong character for a single bit position of the
codeword. Also recall that we assumed σ ≥ 4nǫs+2δ, ǫs being the probability
of symmetric encryption to be broken, which means O(σ) = O(δ) when we
assume ǫs is negligible.
An interesting point of our method is that it allows partially collusion se-
cure constructions and in such a construction, the round complexity of tracing
is quadratic in terms of the collusion bound which we call w instead of n. This
generalized case is given in Table 5.2 as a separate row.
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5.7 Stronger Traceability Modes
5.7.1 Public Traceability
In Eurocrypt 2005, Chabanne, Phan and Pointcheval [59] introduced the no-
tion of public traceability where tracing is a procedure that requires no secrets.
A two user solution was presented in [59] and further improved to the multiuser
setting with short transmissions in [38] and [60]. In above schemes, the public
key size and the private key sizes are all linear in length of the fingerprinting
code employed for key distribution. The trace and revoke scheme of [43] is
also publicly traceable with shorter key sizes, i.e. O(
√
n) many, but requires
higher bandwidth, i.e. it has a ciphertext length of O(
√
n).
Our proposed generic construction supports the public traceability as there
is no tracing key. The fingerprinting code is used to variate the way receivers
decrypt logically without affecting the key-distribution. The encryption is
done through a sampler that is of public knowledge, and any third-party can
trace by generating a code. The code may have secrets available to the tracing
party but this does not affect any other party to run her tracing capability.
Hence, we provide the first publicly traceable schemes that have constant
private key sizes with reasonable public key size and ciphertext length.
5.7.2 Tracing and Revoking Pirate Rebroadcasts
It is possible to obtain a scheme for tracing and revoking pirate rebroadcasting
based on our generic construction. In such adversarial setting, an adversary,
corrupting a number of traitors, decrypts the message through the key material
available to him and rebroadcasts the clear message. Note that the rebroadcast
does not reveal any information about the traitor-keys unless the clear message
itself is bound to a specific user key. In this direction, we transmit different
versions of the content so that each version is decryptable by different set
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of keys. This is achieved in the literature by watermarking the content. In
such setting, traitor-identification is achieved through observing the pattern
of watermarks available to the pirate.
Let us provide a simple description on how to make our generic trans-
formation work in the pirate rebroadcasting setting. We first generate the
watermarked versions of the content m denoted by m1,m2, . . . ,mq. For sim-
plicity, we prefer an encryption in the standard model, a KEM version is
possible by replacing mi with a further level of symmetric encryption key.
Similar to the original construction, we have a partition {V1, V2, . . . , Vq} of [n]
(the choice of the partition is through a sampler in regular transmission and
through fingerprinting code in tracing transmissions). Setting Si = Vi ∩ S for
each i = 1, . . . , q, we broadcast the message c = (c1||c2|| . . . ||cq) where, for
each i = 1, . . . , q, we construct ci = hdri||ei and
(hdri, Ki)← BEncPKB, Si, ei ← SEncKi(mi)
The traceability of the scheme above can be proven in almost exact way as
we did for the original transformation in Section 5.5. We will not require linear
tracing strategy as watermarking already differentiates the way we encrypt for
different subsets in the partition.
Our generic scheme, instantiated with any of the schemes [21, 65, 66], will
lead the first tracing and revoking pirate rebroadcasts in the public key setting
with constant private key size and short transmission lengths.
5.8 Discussion
In this chapter, we have proposed a method for converting any BE scheme into
a T&R scheme. The tracing round complexity of a T&R scheme generated
by our generic method turns out to be quite decent. Performance of such
a scheme turns out to be asymptotically same as that of the BE used as a
primitive.
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Chapter 6
Anonymous Trace and Revoke
using Broadcast Encryption
As we see in the previous chapters, in a digital content distribution system,
both BE and T&R are crucial features. However, while these advances are
done in DRM systems, interestingly, a very important feature, privacy, was
ignored. In almost all BE schemes and all T&R systems, the set of authorized
users are sent together with the broadcast and readily available to everyone
eavesdropping the broadcast. Although this is indeed a big privacy concern in
many digital content distribution systems it is addressed in only three works
so far [75, 76, 77], all being BE schemes.
The BE scheme of Barth et al. [75] uses a key-private IND-CCA secure
public key encryption (PKE) scheme. The security of this work is proved in
the random oracle model. In another paper of these authors [37] a private
linear broadcast encryption primitive is used but only as a building block to
achieve a tracing functionality over their BE scheme.
In a recent work [76], Fazio and Perera propose what they call an outsider
anonymous broadcast encryption scheme which achieves a weaker notion of
anonymity. In this work, the identities are hidden only from outsiders and
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authorized users are still allowed to learn other authorized users.
The most recent and complete work on anonymous BE schemes is by Libert
et al. [77], where anonymous BE is achieved either from key-private IND-CCA
secure PKE schemes or any identity based encryption scheme. Their main
construction yields the most efficient anonymous BE scheme and they prove
adaptive IND-CCA security for all of their constructions.
In this chapter we employ our tracing technique from the previous chap-
ter that makes use of fingerprinting codes in order to obtain anonymous T&R
schemes from anonymous BE schemes. As a result, we propose the first anony-
mous T&R scheme.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 gives the for-
mal definitions of the cryptographic primitives we will use, and the security
definitions regarding them. Then we will explain the generic method for ob-
taining anonymous T&R from anonymous BE schemes. Finally, we conclude
the paper with the conclusion section.
6.1 Preliminaries and Definitions
6.1.1 Boneh-Shaw Fingerprinting Codes
Since we will use Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting codes in this paper, we briefly
give their definition here.
In order to obtain an n-collusion secure Boneh-Shaw (ℓ, n)-code with ǫ-
error probability, we first need to form a n-by-(n− 1)d matrix, where d is the
block size which has a close relation to the performance of the code that will
be explained later. ℓ is the alphabet size of the code. In this matrix, ith row
consists of d(i − 1) 0s, followed by all 1s. For example, for a (4, 2)-code with
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d = 3, we form the following matrix:

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


Then, we choose a (n − 1)d-permutation π to permute the columns. This
permutation plays an important role and needs to stay hidden.
According to the original use of fingerprinting codes, all copies of the digital
content to be sold is marked with a user codeword, which is a row in this matrix
permuted by π. The idea is that when users with different copies marked in
different positions of the content forms a coalition, they will not be able to
obtain a copy that will traced back to an innocent user. In order to see the
idea, consider users 1,3, and 4 forms a coalition. Then, their descendant set
will consist of pirate codewords having same letters (bits in this case) in certain
positions and they will not be able to know which ones to alter in order to
frame user 2. Note that this is due to the hidden permutation, otherwise, they
would know that they need to leave first half as 0 and the second half as 1.
For complete security analysis of Boneh-Shaw codes, see [63].
6.1.2 Anonymous Broadcast Encryption
In a usual BE setting, there are n users, each of which maintains a set of keys
distributed by the broadcaster beforehand. Throughout the chapter we will
denote the set of all users {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n]. When the broadcaster wants
to broadcast a message, it encrypts the message in such a way that only the
intended users can decrypt it. In order keep our construction as general as
possible, we consider the following model of BE consisting of three algorithms
(KeyDist, Encrypt, Decrypt):
• KeyDist(1n) generates private keys ski for users i ∈ [n] and a public
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key PK. (These private keys are assumed to be transferred to the user
securely. For example they can be embedded into users’ devices before-
hand.)
• Encrypt(PK, S) prepares an enabling header hdr and a master key K
for the intended receiver set S ⊆ [n].
• Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr), using their private key ski, users try to decrypt
the header hdr to retrieve the master key K.
Note that the decrypt algorithm does not get S as a parameter. Although
in many BE schemes, this would not mean anything since hdr can implicitly
include the information of S, but since we are dealing with anonymous BE
schemes, it is obvious that hdr must not leak any information about the set
S. Of course, we will show that our generic construction inherits this property
from the anonymous BE scheme used.
One may also note that there is no message in the definition above. This
is due to the model we adhere to, namely the Key Encapsulation Mechanism
(KEM) model, where the encrypt algorithm encrypts a master secret key in-
stead of the message itself, and the actual message is encrypted with a secure
secret key encryption scheme such as AES using this master secret key. We
use this model because of two reasons. First, any BE scheme can be used
as a KEM by encrypting a randomly chosen master secret key instead of the
message, which makes KEM model more general in the sense of capturing the
most BE schemes. Second, KEM is the natural use of BE schemes in real
world applications since encrypting the possibly large message/data with a
fast secret key encryption scheme is favorable to encrypting it directly with
the BE scheme for performance reasons obviously.
Correctness and confidentiality definitions for BE schemes are same as the
previous chapter, therefore we proceed with the definition of anonymity for
BE schemes.
120
6.1.2.1 Anonymity
Now we formally define anonymity property for BE schemes. We will first
define the anonymity game for BE schemes in the KEM model against CCA
adversaries as follows.
Game 4 (Broadcast ANO-KEM-IND-CCA2 Game) Both A and C are
given the number of users, n.
• Setup. C runs KeyDist(1n) to obtain private keys sk1, . . . , skn and the
public key PK. Then, C sends the public key PK to A.
• Query Phase 1. A makes polynomially many private key and decryp-
tion queries of the form (i) and (i, hdr) where i ∈ [n], respectively. C
responds with ski and K ← Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr), to respective types
of queries.
• Challenge. A chooses two sets S0 and S1, and sends them to C. C
selects a random bit b runs algorithm Encrypt(PK, Sb) and obtains
(hdr∗, K∗). The challenger then sends hdr∗ to A as the challenge
(header).
• Query Phase 2. A makes polynomially many decryption queries of
the form (i, hdr) where i ∈ [n], and hdr 6= hdr∗. C responds with K ←
Decrypt(PK, ski, hdr).
• Guess. A guesses b′ for b and wins if b′ = b.
Definition A broadcast encryption scheme B is ǫ-anonymous in the ANO-
KEM-IND-CCA2 model if for any polynomial time attacker A we have
AdvA = |Pr[A wins]− 1/2| = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| ≤ ǫ
where AdvA denotes the advantage of the attacker A for winning the
anonymity game described above.
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6.1.3 Anonymous Trace and Revoke
A T&R system is essentially a BE scheme with tracing capabilities. So, we
may define a T&R system by the following four algorithms:
• Setup(1n) generates private keys sk1, . . . , skn, public key PK and pos-
sibly a tracing key TK.
• Transmit(PK, S) prepares a header hdr and a symmetric key K.
• Receive(PK, ski, hdr), using the private key ski, decrypts the header
hdr to retrieve the key K. It will be successful if and only if user i is
in the subset S that is used in the Transmit algorithm but not actually
transmitted.
• Trace(S,DσS, PK, TK) identifies a set of traitors, denoted by A ⊆ S,
whose key(s) must have contributed in the construction of the pirate
decoder DσS.
Assumptions: In this chapter, we consider black-box tracing where de-
coders cannot be reverse engineered and the keys inside cannot be revealed
directly. Instead, tracer is only allowed to make transmissions to the pirate
decoder and see whether it can decrypt or not (i.e., it has black-box access
to it). Pirate decoders are also assumed to be resettable (does not maintain
state during tracing) and available (remains available as long as the tracing
process continues). In the literature, almost all of the positive results in de-
signing traitor tracing schemes (including the schemes that we compare to our
constructions) are successful against such decoders.
Correctness, confidentiality, and anonymity definitions for T&R schemes
are the same as their BE counterparts. So we skip them here. There is one ad-
ditional property for T&R systems, though, which is traceability. Traceability
is defined via the following game between an attacker A and a challenger C:
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Game 5 (Tracing Game) Both A and C are given the number of users, n,
and the upper bound t on traitor coalition size.
• Request. A chooses a traitor subset T of size at most t and requests
their private keys from C.
• Provide. C runs Setup(1n) to obtain the keys. Then, C sends all ski
such that i ∈ T and the public key PK to A. It keeps the tracing key
TK.
• Forge decoder. A chooses a set S, and creates a (σ, S)-pirate decoder
box DσS which, by definition, correctly decrypts the broadcasts to set S
with probability at least σ. It outputs DσS.
• Trace. The challenger C runs Trace(S,DσS, PK, TK) to obtain an ac-
cused traitor set A ⊆ S.
Attacker A wins the game if the set A is empty or it is not a subset of T .
Definition We say that T= (Setup, Transmit, Receive, Trace) is a T&R
scheme with tracing success probability α against t-coalition σ-pirates if no
polynomial time attacker A, forging a σ-decoder by corrupting a traitor coali-
tion of size t, can win the game described above with probability more than
1− α.
6.2 Generic Transformation
In this section, we show how to transform any anonymous broadcast encryp-
tion (ABE) scheme into an anonymous T&R scheme by employing a tracing
mechanism. This transformation requires a simple modification in the regular
transmission of the ABE scheme: whenever a transmission is to be made to a
set S, instead of encrypting directly for S, we first partition S into two subsets
S1, S2 and encrypt for both of them separately.
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This partitioning is the base of our tracing method. More specifically, in the
tracing transmissions, we send two different messages to different partitions
and according to which one the pirate decrypts, we deduce which side the
traitor key resides. But the transmission is done according to a fingerprinting
code so that the results of several partitionings identifies a specific traitor
with overwhelming probability as we will show in our analysis. The T&R
construction will inherit the anonymity of the primitive ABE since neither
side will leak information about their respective Si. With this intuition, we
will prove anonymity of the T&R scheme obtained.
Let B be an ABE scheme consisting of three algorithms B.KeyDist(1n),
B.Enc(PKB, S), and B.Dec(PKB, ski, hdr). We design the algorithms of our
generic scheme T, TKeyDist, Transmit, Receive and Trace as follows.
• TRKeyDist(1n) runs the key distribution algorithm BKeyDist(1n) of
B. This will produce a public key PKB and a set of private keys ski,
i ∈ U , which will be distributed to the receivers. A symmetric encryption
scheme, Sym = (Sym.Enc, Sym.Dec), is determined to be used in trans-
missions. It sets up a Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code F = (CodeGen,
Identify), and some auxiliary information aux. Here, we note that the
actual codewords are not generated at this moment. Finally, the public
key will be PKT =< 1
n, PKB, Sym, F, aux >.
Transmit and Receive algorithms are depicted in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. We
design our transmission algorithm in the KEM setting, i.e. we do not take any
message as input but rather choose a random encapsulation key K to be used
in symmetric encryption of the message.
• Transmit(PKT, S) The algorithm first choses a random key K to be
transmitted and a partition {V1, V2} of [n]. It sets Si = Vi∩S for i = 1, 2.
The transmission algorithm then runs the encryption algorithm of the
BE scheme for both subsets and broadcasts the message cˆ = (hdr, c)
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Figure 6.1: Transmit algorithm is shown. First two BE encryption algorithms
are run in order to get two different encapsulations, (K1, hdr1) and (K2, hdr2).
Then, a random master encapsulation key K is chosen and encrypted with the
symmetric scheme using both keys K1 and K2. The actual data is encrypted
only once with K. The values that actually gets transmitted are: cˆ = (hdr, c)
where hdr = (hdr1, hdr2, e1, e2).
Figure 6.2: Receive algorithm for a user i ∈ S2 is shown. So, when it parses
cˆ, obtains hdr1 and hdr2 and when it tries the second encapsulation as in the
figure, since it is assumed to be in the set S2, it can obtain m by first finding
K2 via the BE decryption algorithm, then finding K by decrypting e2 with K2
and then decrypting c with K.
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where hdr = (hdr1, hdr2, e1, e2) and for i = 1, 2,
(hdri, Ki)← BE.Enc(PKB, Si), ei ← Sym.EncKi(K)
A special attention is needed to understand why we use a two-level key
encapsulation mechanism. First of all, we would like to encrypt the data only
once with a symmetric scheme, because the data is typically long and it can
be expensive to encrypt it directly with any BE mechanism. However, it is
impossible to force both BE encryptions to produce the same key. Therefore,
the symmetric key to encrypt the data, K, is selected randomly and this key is
encapsulated by encrypting it with the keys produced by the BE encryptions.
Note that the BE primitive is also formulated as a KEM. This is because we
want to make our transformation be applicable for all BE schemes, we have
to take into account that in some broadcast encryption schemes that support
key-encapsulation (e.g. the scheme of [21]), the sender has no control on the
choice of the key (Ki’s in our construction) transmitted.
• Receive(PKT, skj , cˆ) The j-th user parses the public key PKB from
PKT and extracts (hdr1, hdr2, e1, e2, c) from cˆ. It then tries both hdr1
and hdr2 with the decryption function of B and retrieves the key K as
follows:
Kk ← BE.Dec(PKB, skj, hdrk)
and the valid side is used to obtain K:
K ← Sym.DecKk(ek)
Now we explain our tracing algorithm. As usual, we assume that a pirate
decoder with a certain ability is detected and the tracer can make queries to it
with ciphertexts of its choice. We call these ciphertexts as tracing ciphertexts.
In our algorithm, the tracer prepares tracing ciphertexts as follows:
We first generate a Boneh-Shaw code C = {c1, . . . , cn} of length ℓ by run-
ning F .CodeGen(1n). Then, for every column j ∈ [ℓ] of this code, we prepare
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new kind of tracing ciphertext. For the j-th column, the partition of a set
S in a tracing ciphertext is based on this particular j-th column of the code
rather than partitioning randomly as in normal ciphertexts. Denoting the j-th
partition by Sj = {Sj,0, Sj,1}, the subset Sj,i is chosen to be S∩{k : ck[j] = i}.
In other words, S is partitioned according to 0s and 1s in the j-th column.
However, we encrypt a random message to Sj,0 whereas we encrypt a valid
message m to Sj,1. Therefore, if the pirate decoder can decrypt this tracing
ciphertext, i.e., if it can retrieve m, we deduce that the letter of the pirate
codeword in this position (column) is 1. Otherwise, we deduce that it is 0.
After we make several tries for each column, we get a pirate codeword w.
(The number of tries for each column will be explained below, in the formal
description.) Then we give this codeword to the F .Identify algorithm which
will output a user index that is responsible for the acts of the pirate decoder.
Now we describe the tracing algorithm formally. For simplicity, we consider
tracing against the pirate decoders of type D1S first. Such a decoder is called a
perfect decoder as it correctly decrypts all well-formed ciphertexts. In reality,
the pirate may be content with a decoder that works only a fraction of the
time, that is formulated in our definition as σ-pirate with σ ≤ 1. A solution
for σ < 1 values will be discussed later in Section 5.5.4.
• Trace(S,D1S, PKT, TK) first parses 1n, PKB, Sym and the description
of F from PKT. It produces a Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code C =
{c1, . . . , cn} ← F .CodeGen(1n) and initializes a pirate codeword w ← 0ℓ.
Denoting the length of the code C by ℓ, the tracing algorithm repeats
the following sub-procedure for each j = 1, . . . , ℓ:
We create a partition {Sj,0, Sj,1} of S where Sj,v ← S ∩ {k : ck[j] = v}
holds for v = {0, 1}. Next, we approximate the decryption probability
of D1S when queried by tracing ciphertexts of type (j, v) which consists
of the transmission c = (c0||c1) where, for each i = {0, 1}, we have
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ci = hdri||ei, where (hdri, Ki)← BE.Enc(PKB, Si) and
ei ←
{
Sym.EncKi(R), i = 0
Sym.EncKi(K), i = 1
for randomly chosenR andK. We say the decoder succeeds in decryption
if it returns K. If the the decoder returns K, we set wj ← 1, otherwise
wj ← 0.
Once we perform this procedure for all j, we get a pirate codeword
w and we use this codeword with the identification algorithm of the
fingerprinting code: t ← F .Identify(w). Finally, the user associated
with the t-th codeword is accused of being a traitor.
To have a correct tracing, it is important that the produced pirate code-
word is in the descendant set of the traitor coalition T . This is equivalent of
claiming that if wj = s then Sj,s ∩ T 6= ∅. As we will argue formally later in
our traceability proof, this can be ensured by the security of the underlying
primitives.
6.2.1 Security Properties of the Construction
In this section, we will prove the security properties achieved by our generic
construction. Here we state the complete theorem and in the following subsec-
tions we will prove three different properties, confidentiality, anonymity and
traceability, with three lemmas which together will constitute the proof of the
theorem.
Theorem 6.2.1 [Security properties of the generic construction] Consider the
generic anonymous T&R scheme T that is constructed as above by employing
an anonymous BE scheme B, a symmetric encryption scheme SYM and Boneh-
Shaw fingerprinting code F.
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Let B be KEM-IND-CCA secure with probability ǫb, SYM be IND-CCA secure
with probability ǫs and F be an (ǫf , t)-identifier Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code.
Then, T is an anonymous T&R scheme satisfies confidentiality with re-
spect to Definition 5.3.1.2, anonymity with respect to Definition 6.1.2.1, and
traceability with respect to Definition 6.1.3.
6.2.1.1 Broadcast Confidentiality
We first prove the security of our construction regarding the confidentiality of
the broadcast messages.
Lemma 6.2.2 (Confidentiality) Let T be a trace and revoke scheme that is
constructed through our generic transformation from a BE scheme B that is
ǫb-secure in the KEM-IND-CCA model, a symmetric encryption scheme S that
is ǫs-secure in the IND-CPA model, and a Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code F.
Then, T would satisfy the KEM-IND-CCA security for any polynomial time
attacker AT such that
AdvAT ≤ 2 · ǫb + 2 · ǫs
It further holds that if the underlying scheme B supports adaptive security then
so does the scheme T.
Proof We will use a game hopping approach to prove the lemma: we start
with the basic confidentiality game for trace and revoke scheme. We next mod-
ify the basic game gradually to reach a final game which provides the adversary
no advantage. This is a standard proof technique that bounds the advantage of
the adversary in the original game by the differences in the subsequent games.
Let G0 be the real KEM-IND-CCA message confidentiality game (Game
1) played between an adversary AT and a challenger CT of the generic T&R
construction. The details of this game is depicted in Figure 6.3. We are
interested in showing that the success probability of any attacker in this game
is negligible.
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Figure 6.3: Game G0: the actual KEM-IND-CCA game.
Remark. In the figure, we considered a static attack model where the
adversary commits to the set S∗ it wants to attack. The challenger publishes
the public key afterwards. In contrast, it is also possible that the adversary
commits to the set S∗ after it observes the public key. The latter, denoted
by adaptive attack, is a stronger attack model as the public key may let the
adversary have some non-trivial information that is useful for the choice of the
target set. The order of the commitment of the target set and the publication
of the public key will not affect the validity of our proof arguments below. The
choice of the order is propagated in our transformation smoothly. Hence we
will consider the security for static attack model, the adaptive case follows in
a similar way.
Now, we proceed with the formal description of the subsequent games
starting with G0. Let Wj denote the event that the adversary AT wins the
j-th game Gj:
Game 0: The first game, G0, depicted in Figure 6.3 is identical to the
KEM security game for trace and revoke schemes. Thus,
|Pr[W0]− 1
2
| = AdvAT
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In this game, after the key distribution and decryption query phases, the
challenger prepares a valid ciphertext. It performs the partitions {S∗i }i∈{1,2}
in a way indistinguishable from Boneh-Shaw codes and constructs the headers
(hdr∗1, K
∗
1 )← BE.Enc(PKB, S∗1), e∗1 ← Sym.EncK∗1(k0)
(hdr∗2, K
∗
2 )← BE.Enc(PKB, S∗2), e∗2 ← Sym.EncK∗2(k0)
where k0 and k1 are randomly chosen keys compatible with the symmetric
encryption algorithm Sym.Enc. Along with the full headers 〈hdr∗i , e∗i 〉i∈{1,2},
the challenger transmits kb for a randomly selected bit b. So, the challenge
question is “Is this key the same as the encrypted one?” We say the adversary
wins the game if it guesses b correctly.
Game 1: This game (G1) is identical to G0 except the way the challenger
prepares the encryption for e∗1. In G1, the encryption e
∗
1 is made under a
randomly chosen key K+1 instead of K
∗
1 :
e∗1 ← Sym.EncK+1 (k0)
Such modification breaks the relation between the header hdr∗1 and e
∗
1. We
claim that any adversary that can distinguish its views among games G0 and
G1 can be used to break the security of the underlying BE scheme. Formally
stated, there exists a broadcast encryption adversary AB whose running time
is about the same as AT such that:
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = 2AdvAB
Figure 6.4 shows how to construct such an adversary AB that intends to break
the KEM-IND-CCA security of the broadcast encryption B. The adversary AB
will simulate the challenger CT of the trace and revoke security game. The
simulator will embed the challenge it receives from the broadcast challenger
CB to the challenge requested by the adversary AT .
After receiving the set S∗, the simulator will create the partition S∗ =
{S∗1 , S∗2} immediately and forwards S∗1 to the broadcast encryption challenger
CB. This is a crucial step to be able to simulate the secret keys of the
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Figure 6.4: Constructing a broadcast encryption adversary AB that simulates
the challenger of the trace and revoke adversary AT . Its advantage is reduced
to the AT ’s ability of distinguishing its views among games G0 and G1.
scheme T whose keys are basically the keys of the underlying broadcast en-
cryption scheme. The simulator will be able to respond the decryption queries
〈k, hdr1, e1, hdr2, e2〉 of the adversary AT as long as the secret key of the in-
tended user k is available to the adversary AB. Otherwise, the adversary
forwards the decryption queries 〈k, hdr∗j 〉 for j = 1, 2 to the challenger CB and
retrieves the key to decrypt the symmetric encryption e∗j .
After requesting the challenge from AT , the adversary AB simulates the
challenger CT as follows: The first side of the challenge comes from CB which
provides (hdr∗, K+) as its challenge. Upon receiving (hdr∗, K+) from the
challenger CB we set hdr
∗
1 = hdr
∗ and e∗1 = Sym.EncK+(k0). The second
side of the challenge is easily produced by the simulator as (hdr∗2, K
∗
2) ←
BE.Enc(PKB, S
∗
2) and e
∗
2 ← Sym.EncK∗2 (k0).
Observe, now, that if the challenge of CB is a valid BE ciphertext (this
corresponds to the case d = 0 in Figure 6.4), the adversary AT plays in G0.
In contrast, AT plays in G1 if the challenge is not valid (d = 1 in Figure
6.4). Let us compute the winning probability of AB: (i) if d = 0 AB wins
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the game if AT wins the game, hence bounded by Pr[W0]; (ii) if d = 1 AB
wins the game if AT loses the game, hence bounded by 1 − Pr[W1]. Thus,
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = AdvAB .
Game 2: G2 is the same as G1 except that this time, second side of
the T&R challenge comes from the BE challenge. The first side is prepared
as an invalid encryption by the simulator. With the same reasoning above,
|Pr[W1] − Pr[W2]| = AdvAB . We omit the details since it will be almost the
same as above.
Note that, at this point, both BE keys K∗1 and K
∗
2 are distorted. Hence,
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W2]| = 2AdvAB which is then upper-bounded by 2ǫb.
We continue with two more games gradually replacing the key k0 with
random keys.
Game 3: G3 is identical to G2 except the way the challenger prepares the
encryption for e∗1. In Game G3, we set:
e∗1 ← Sym.EncK+1 (k
+
0 )
where k+0 is randomly chosen. Such modification in Game G3 hides totally
the information of kb in the first part of the header. We next claim that there
exists a symmetric encryption adversary AS whose running time is about the
same as AT such that:
|Pr[W2]− Pr[W3]| = AdvAS
We construct the adversary AS in a similar way we have constructed the
adversary AB. We omit the details of the simulation due to simplicity and
similarity. Hence the probability differences above are upper-bounded by ǫs.
Game 4: As the reader might guess, G4 is identical to G3 except that the
way the challenger prepares the encryption for e∗2. Once again, same analysis
as the last one leads us
|Pr[W3]− Pr[W4]| = AdvAS
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Note that this last game G4 gives absolutely no information about kb thus
the probability Pr[W4] of the adversary winning the game G4 is
1
2
. Applying
the triangular inequalities over the probability differences above we obtain:
2 · ǫb + 2 · ǫs ≥ AdvAT
which completes the security proof of our generic transformation.
6.2.1.2 Anonymity
In this section we will show that if the underlying BE scheme is anonymous,
so is the resulting T&R scheme produced by our construction.
Lemma 6.2.3 [Anonymity of the generic construction] Given the construc-
tion described in Theorem 6.2.1, the resulting T&R scheme satisfies anonymity
with respect to Definition 6.1.2.1.
Proof The standard anonymity game applied to our generic construction is
shown in Figure 6.5.
We prove the lemma by showing that given an attacker that breaks the
anonymity of the T&R scheme, we can build an attacker that breaks the
anonymity of the underlying ABE scheme.
Construction of such an attacker is as follows: It simulates the T&R chal-
lenger in Figure 6.5. Upon receiving the challenge request (S0, S1), it finds the
intersection S2 ← S0 ∩S1. Then, it sends to the ABE challenger the challenge
request (S0\S2, S1\S2). It also makes the encryption hdr2 ← BE.Enc(PK, S2).
Upon receiving the challenge, hdr, it sets hdr1 ← hdr and sends its own chal-
lenge (hdr1, hdr2) to the T&R attacker AT it has. The answer returned by AT
is exactly directly returned as the answer to CB. Clearly, the success proba-
bility of AB constructed is exactly the same as that of AT and this concludes
the proof.
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Figure 6.5: Standard anonymity game.
6.2.1.3 Traceability of Perfect Decoders
In this section, we will prove that perfect pirate decoders can be traced back
to at least one of the traitor users that contributed to its forgery. A perfect
decoder D1S is a decoder which can decrypt all messages addressed to set S.
Specifically, we will prove that no polynomial time attacker A that forges a
perfect decoder can win the tracing game (Game 5) with some non-negligible
probability. i.e., we will bound the winning probability of such an attacker A
by a function of the security bounds of the underlying primitives. We leave
the tracing of imperfect decoders to the next section.
Before we prove the traceability of our scheme, we need to point out one
subtle yet important issue. Recall that in regular transmissions, the receiver
subset is partitioned by imitating a Boneh-Shaw code, i.e., by selecting a ran-
dom index before which all letters are thought as 0 and the rest are thought as
1. This guarantees statistical indistinguishability between tracing and regular
ciphertexts. This is indeed a crucial point because if the pirate were to be able
to distinguish between two types of ciphertext, it could have been designed
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in such a way that in tracing ciphertexts, it can perform a special trick and
frame an innocent user.
Lemma 6.2.4 [Traceability of the generic construction] Consider the generic
anonymous T&R scheme T that is constructed as above by employing an anony-
mous BE scheme B, and Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code F. a symmetric en-
cryption scheme SYM
Let B be KEM-IND-CCA secure with probability ǫb, SYM be IND-CCA secure
with probability ǫs and F be an (ǫf , t)-identifier Boneh-Shaw fingerprinting code.
Then, T is an anonymous T&R scheme with success probability 1−ǫf−ℓǫ/4
against t-coalition 1-pirate’s if it holds that
ǫs + ǫb < 1/8
where ǫ is a probability that can be decreased arbitrarily by increasing the num-
ber of experiments in the tracing procedure.
Proof We consider a resettable pirate decoderD1S constructed for a subset S ∈
[n] by coalitions of at most t traitors. The tracing process can be considered as
three stages: (1) Approximating the success probability of choosing the correct
value for each ℓ pirate codeword bits, (2) Producing a pirate codeword w in the
descendant set, and (3) Identifying a traitor index through the fingerprinting
code.
Before these steps, first remember that the trace algorithm performs ex-
periments to find out individual pirate codeword bits. For a readable notation,
for each bit position j, we define three experiments:
• Expj,0: Hypothetical experiment where both sides get valid messages.
• Expj,1: Experiments run by the tracer where only second part gets a
valid message and first part gets a random one.
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• Expj,2: Hypothetical experiment where both sides get random messages.
We define σj,v as the expected success probabilities in experiments of type
Expj,v. Since we assumed a perfect decoder, we say that σj,0 = 1. Since
experiments of type Expj,2 leaks no information about the message, σj,2 =
1/|M |. For simplicity, we assume that σj,2 = 0.
We also define the approximation counterparts: We define pj,v as the actual
success ratios in respective experiments of type Expj,v. Since we do not need
to actually approximate the hypothetical types of experiments, we assume
that pj,0 = σj,0 = 1 and pj,2 = σj,2 = 0. In the first step, we will bound the
difference between pj,1 and σj,1.
(1) Approximation: First, assuming λ experiments are performed, we define
µj,v = λ · σj,v, which is the expected number of times the decoder succeeds
out of λ experiments of type (j, v) and ρj,v = λ · pj,v as the actual number
of successes during the approximation process. We would like to bound the
approximation difference |ρj,1 − µj,1| and thus |pj,1 − σj,1|. We claim that,
choosing λ = 3 ln(8/ǫ)/∆2, Pr[|ρj,1 − µj,1| ≥ λ ·∆] ≤ ǫ/4.
Due to the resettability of the decoder after each tracing query we can con-
sider the experiments performed by the tracer are independent. By applying
a two-tailed form of the Chernoff bound we will have:
Pr[|ρj,1 − µj,1| ≥ α] ≤ 2e−
α2
3µj,1 ≤ 2e−α
2
3λ
Substituting α = λ ·∆ and λ = 3 ln(8/ǫ)/∆2 we obtain:
2e−α
2/3λ = 2e−
λ2∆2
3λ = 2e−∆
2λ/3
= 2e− ln(8/ǫ) = ǫ/4
The above analysis shows that |ρj,1−µj,1| ≤ λ ·∆ = 3 ln(8/ǫ)/∆ with prob-
ability at least 1− ǫ/4. This is equivalent to |pj,1 − σj,1| ≤ ∆ with probability
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at least 1− ǫ/4.
(2) Pirate Codeword Generation: First, remember that the tracer sets
wj = 0 if pj,1 < 1/2 and wj = 1 otherwise. We argue that the produced
pirate codeword w is in the descendant set of the traitor coalition T with high
probability. This is equivalent of claiming that, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, if wj = b then
Sj,b ∩ T 6= ∅ for b ∈ {0, 1}. So, we need to show that with a high probability,
for all positions, decision of the trace algorithm is not false.
Now, suppose that for jth position, tracer sets wj = 0. We claim that with
overwhelming probability, there exists a traitor in Sj,0. Since tracer sets wj = 0
it must be the case that pj,1 < 1/2. We already assumed that σj,0 = pj,0 = 1.
Together with the inequality |σj,1 − pj,1| ≤ ∆ which has a proability at least
1− ǫ/4, we have
|σj,0 − σj,1| ≥ |pj,0 − pj,1| −∆
with probability at least 1− ǫ/4. Now, since pj,1 < 1/2, and pj,0 = 1,
It follows that if the tracer returns the value 0, i.e.,
|σj,0 − σj,1| ≥ 1− pj,1 −∆ ≥ 1/2−∆
and choosing ∆ = 1/4 we get:
|σj,0 − σj,1| ≥ 1/4
Since we assumed that ǫs + ǫb < 1/8 at the beginning,
|σj,0 − σj,1| ≥ 1/4 > 2(ǫs + ǫb)
with probability at least 1− ǫ/4.
In such a case, we can prove that there exists a traitor in Sj,0 by con-
tradiction, as follows. Assume that |σj,0 − σj,1| > 2(ǫs + ǫb) and there exists
no traitor in Sj,0. This contradicts with the security claims of the underlying
symmetric encryption scheme SYM and broadcast encryption scheme B. Indeed,
if there is no traitor in set Sj,0, the pirate decoder can distinguish between the
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tracing ciphertext of type (j, 0) and of type (j, 1) by only breaking the under-
lying encryption schemes. Hence, the distinguishing probability is bounded by
2(ǫs + ǫb).
Due to symmetry, the case where tracer sets wj = 1 succeeds with the
same probability, ǫ/4.
Finally, this analysis must be done for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, therefore the
probability that a pirate codeword in the descendant set is created would be
at least 1− ℓǫ/4.
(3) Traitor Identification. We argue above that the pirate codeword is in
the descendant set of the traitor coalition. In our application of fingerprinting
code, the partition in a tracing transmission does not hide the user codewords,
i.e. the code is open to the adversary. Hence, Identify(w) returns a traitor
index with probability at least 1− ǫf as long as the fingerprinting code is open
(not secret as in the cases of Tardos or Boneh-Shaw codes). This completes
the proof of the traceability. The overall failure probability of accusing an
innocent user is bounded by ǫf + ℓǫ/4 (for the failures in identification, and in
approximations, respectively) for the given parameters.
6.2.2 Instantiation with Libert et al. and its properties
Since the scheme of Libert et al. [77] is the most recent and complete anony-
mous BE scheme, we consider it for an instantiation of our method. When
we instantiate our generic method with the scheme of [77], the complexities
are not affected because the BE scheme requires linear in the number of users,
and our generic construction not even doubles the ciphertext size because total
number of users does not change. The resulting T&R scheme is indeed too
expensive to be used as is, but still it is the first anonymous T&R scheme.
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6.3 Discussion
We have proposed a generic way of obtaining anonymous T&R systems from
anonymous BE schemes. Thus we obtained the first anonymous T&R system
and showed that it satisfies IND-CCA security. This is indeed an important
result that opens a direction towards considering anonymity in T&R systems.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have considered different types of broadcast encryption
schemes and improved their performances or capabilities in different ways.
First, we investigated the CS and SD schemes which are the standard meth-
ods in use today and we proposed using profiling in order to improve their
transmission complexity. With the new advancements of technology, it may
be possible to maintain such a system especially in systems like the pay-TV
applications. Second, we considered free rider relaxation problem for the PI
scheme, which is a recently developed BE scheme, having performances similar
to that of SD scheme, and we showed that by allowing a decent amount of free
riders, transmission complexity can be reduced significantly. This kind of re-
laxation can be used in systems where allowing free riders is not a big problem.
For example sharing non-critical content on the Internet is a good candidate
for being such a system, since neither the privacy of content is highly critical,
nor the probability of a free rider to be interested in a content he can access
as a free rider is high due to large number of users.
In the last two chapters, we considered broadcast encryption schemes in
more detail, looking at their inside. We first proposed a generic way of obtain-
ing a more capable system, called a trace and revoke system by using primitive
broadcast encryption schemes. This lead us to new results such as the first
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ID-based trace and revoke scheme in the literature, first publicly traceable
trace and revoke schemes with short transmissions. It also allowed tracing
and revoking pirate rebroadcasts in the public key setting. Finally, in the last
chapter, we considered the mostly-ignored problem of user privacy in broad-
cast systems, and we showed how an anonymous trace and revoke scheme can
be built using anonymous broadcast encryption schemes in a generic way. In-
stantiated with a recently proposed anonymous BE scheme, we obtained the
first trace and revoke scheme that hides the receiver set.
As a result, we obtained a number of positive results that can stimulate
new research in the context of digital rights management systems, while each
individual result has its own novelty.
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